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The operation of our society heavily relies on high mobility of people. Not only
our social life but also our economy and trade are built upon a system where people
need to be able to move around easily. The costs for building and maintaining a
suitable transportation infrastructure to satisfy those needs are high, and to charge
users is thus a central requirement. This calls for well functioning payment systems
satisfying the multitude of requirements that transportation systems impose on them.
Electronic payment systems have many benefits over traditional cash payments as
they are easy to maintain, can be more secure, reduce revenue collection costs, and
can reduce the execution time of a payment. However, as a drawback, currently em-
ployed electronic payment systems usually reveal a payer’s identity during a payment
which greatly infringes customer privacy. In the transportation domain this allows to
generate fine grain patterns of customers’ locations.
vi
Cryptographic payment protocols called e-cash have been proposed which allow to
preserve a customer’s privacy. E-cash provides provable guarantees for both security
and user privacy, as it allows secure, unlinkable payments which do not reveal the
identity of the payer during a payment. From a security and privacy perspective these
protocols present a good solution. However, even though e-cash protocols have been
proposed three decades ago, there are relatively few actual implementations. One
reason for this is their high computational complexity which makes an implementation
on potential mobile payment devices rather difficult. While customers usually value
their privacy they often do not accept to sacrifice convenience. A fast execution of
payments is thus a hard constraint, which conflicts with the computational complexity
of e-cash schemes.
This dissertation analyzes how e-cash can be used to solve the issue of privacy in
the domain of transportation payments while satisfying the unique requirements of
transportation payment systems and achieving high security and ease of use. Highly-
efficient implementations of the underlying cryptographic primitives of e-cash schemes
on constrained devices as they might be used in the transportation setting are pre-
sented. Based on the efficient implementations of these primitives, e-cash schemes
are analyzed with regards to speed and hardware requirements. The results show
that e-cash presents a good solution for privacy-preserving payments in the domain
of public transport, if the number of coins that have to be spent can be limited. It is
further practically shown that this limitation can be alleviated relying on the e-cash
based privacy-preserving pre-payments with refunds scheme (P4R). Moreover, it is
demonstrated that the promising feature of supporting the encoding of user attributes
into electronic coins can be implemented at only moderate extra cost. Finally, an e-
cash based e-mobility payment scheme is presented which highlights the flexibility
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Our ever-growing globalized world largely relies on high mobility of people, and
it is anticipated that transport activity will only increase in the future. At the same
time, the distribution of the world’s population is changing to an urban one. While in
2011 about 52% of the world’s population lived in urban areas, it is anticipated that
this number will increase to 67% by the year 2050. Additionally, cities grow larger
which leads to an expected number of 37 mega-cities with more than 10 million
inhabitants by 2025 [31].
Especially in cities, where the population density is high, it is important to find
means to reduce Green House Gas (GHG) emissions in order to limit air pollution.
Public transport and e-mobility (the use of electric cars) constitute an appealing
alternative to fuel-based personal vehicles and can greatly reduce GHG emissions in
areas where the population density is high. Additionally, public transport is favorable
from a social point of view, as it gives higher mobility to people who, due to their
income, do not have access to cars [83]. Electric cars avoid local emissions, thus
allowing to regulate the emissions’ location, and, as operated based on electric energy,
renewable energies can at least partially reduce the dependence of transport on oil
resources. To attract people to rely on these types of transport the provision of a well-
functioning public transport infrastructure and a charging infrastructure for electric
cars is of major interest.
However, providing and maintaining a well-functioning transportation infrastruc-
ture is expensive. Use-based fees and payments allow the costs of transportation
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systems to be fairly passed on to their users, facilitating revenue generation and user
incentives. Yet, collecting a large number of payments in a way that it does not
impact the smooth operation of a transportation system is not an easy task. Well
functioning transportation payment systems are required, where the transaction du-
ration of a payment is an essential acceptance criterion. If it takes too long, it easily
leads to congestion at the access points of the transportation system prolonging the
overall trip time of individuals.
When compared to traditional cash payments, electronic payments have many
benefits, especially if points of sales are greatly spread as is the case in the transport
domain. As such they can increase security, they reduce maintenance cost, as no
cash has to be carried around physically, and their execution is usually much faster.
The shorter execution times as well as the fact that no cash has to be carried around
greatly improves user convenience. For a transportation authority a further advantage
of electronic payments is that they enable the collection of meaningful data about
customer behavior, which helps to maintain and improve the provided infrastructure.
1.1 Electronic Payment Systems
Usually, three types of entities are involved in a payment system: payers, payees
and a financial institution [5]. This is in contrast to the bitcoin or related systems,
where no financial institution is backing the system, but rather the system is based on
a peer-to-peer network and an algorithm which ensures that payments are executed
correctly as long as the majority of participants plays honestly [75].
Electronic payment systems can be classified by their transaction date. In pay-later
systems, such as credit card and electronic check systems, a customer receives a bill
over a payment after making a purchase. In pay-now systems, such as debit card
systems, the amount a customer has to pay is transferred to the merchant’s account
during a payment. In prepaid systems, which are similar to cash like systems, a cus-
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tomer withdraws money from her bank account, and stores it in an electronic wallet.
She can later use the money to make purchases [5, 80, 90]. Prepaid systems are usu-
ally used for micro-payments (payments of values below $1) and low-value payments
(payments in the range of $1 to $100), whereas pay-now and pay-later systems are
preferred for high-value payments. In the transportation domain prepaid systems
that are realized using smart cards gain popularity.
Electronic payments can also be categorized by their verification process. Online
(centralized) payment systems involve the interaction with a third party or the back-
end system of the financial institution to validate a payment. This is for example the
case with debit cards, whereas offline (decentralized) payments can be validated au-
tonomously by the device accepting the payment [5, 81, 90]. Online payment systems
have drawbacks with respect to availability. All devices accepting payments have to
have constant access to the back-end system of the controlling financial institution.
If this connection or the back-end system itself fails no payment can be executed, and
it is rather expensive to introduce redundancy in a back-end system.
Electronic payment systems can further be classified by the physical characteris-
tics of their payment devices. One can differentiate between contact payment devices
(as for example magnetic stripe cards, EEPROM cards, and contact smart cards),
proximity cards which do not require a physical connection but only have to be
brought into close proximity of a reader, and short-range communication systems,
such as radio frequency (RF) transponders or radio frequency identification (RFID)
tags. Magnetic stripe cards provide only limited security but are widely used due
to their extremely low cost. EEPROM cards have a little integrated circuit with
hardwired functionality to read out the value stored on them. Smart cards have
a microprocessor, read only memory (ROM) to store an ID and an operating sys-
tem, and electrically erasable programmable read only memory (EEPROM) to store
payment information and history. Thus they provide much better security and multi-
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functionality. Contactless payments are often preferable, as a payer does not have to
insert a payment device into a slot or otherwise physically connect it to a terminal,
which can lead to significantly reduced transaction times. Contactless smart cards
have an inductive coil, which is coupled to another inductive coil in a reader using
RF magnetic fields with a frequency of 125 kHz or 13.56 MHz. RF-transponders or
RFID-tags use backscatter technology to modulate the 900 MHz up to 2450 MHz
electromagnetic field of a reader in response to his requests.
The security requirements of electronic payments are: (I) Integrity and autho-
rization which requires that a malicious user should not be able to create, modify, or
overspend monetary value and a payment should only be initiated after consent of all
involved parties. (II) Confidentiality requires that payment data cannot be exploited
in order to generate user profiles. Different levels of anonymity can be achieved.
Information leakage to outsiders can for example be prevented by encrypting pay-
ment data. But payments can also be anonymous or even unlinkable for the payee
and the financial institution. (III) Availability and reliability requires that payments
can be executed at all times and that they are either executed entirely or not at all,
i.e. parties involved in payments should not loose money due to a system crash [5, 90].
Several examples demonstrate shortcomings of electronic transportation payment
systems, which are in use today. One is the use of proprietary, weak cryptographic
primitives, which leave room for attacks as has for example been demonstrated in [38,
63] and [88]. Another shortcoming is that they do not incorporate means to protect
the user’s (location) privacy. For example, Rankl et al. reported that “in the period
from August 2004 to March 2006 alone, the Oyster system1 was queried 409 times”
which indicates that location data about customers is collected and used by other
agencies [81]. The data that is collected in these systems allows to derive fine grain
1Oyster-card is an electronic prepaid payment system for transport in London [35].
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patterns of customers’ movements and habits. We speculate that the limited effort
to provide anonymous electronic payment systems originates from the facts that (a)
providing anonymity is costly and (b) collecting user data is useful to merchants
and financial institutions. While it has become common to share one’s personal
information, there are convincing arguments why preserving one’s privacy is extremely
important.
1.2 Information Privacy – Should we care about it?
[Location privacy] is the ability of an individual to move in public space with
the expectation that under normal circumstances their location will not be
systematically and secretly recorded for later use. [...]. [Location privacy] is
also about knowing when other people know things about you, and being
able to tell when they are making decisions based on those facts.
—–Andrew J. Blumberg [18]
People are often willing to give up their privacy in order to reach an increase in
convenience and security. When asked why they are not concerned about sacrificing
their privacy the most common answer is: “I’ve got nothing to hide” [94]. The
general perception is that privacy is only of interest to people who engage in illegal
activity. However, maybe people do not fully grasp the power of data collection and
the impact of disclosing certain personal data. As such, while saying that only bad
people require privacy-preserving measures, most people do not feel comfortable to
reveal every detail of their lives in public [43]. As a motivation for this dissertation,
this section briefly tries to answer: What are examples of threats that arise from
disclosing personal data? And related to that, why is it important to protect one’s
personal data?
A first argument for providing an institution with as little personal information as
absolutely necessary is that one has to trust the institution to store the information
securely and prevent malicious parties from having access to it. Even though the
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institution itself might not use the information in a bad way, once in their possession
it is in their power to decide how to secure the data to not give access to malicious
parties. Multiple incidents, in which user data was stolen from companies at a large
scale, e.g. [3] and [79], show that companies do not always store user data secure
enough.
A second argument is that entities in possession of personal data have great power
over the behavior of other people. People behave differently, if they cannot move
around freely. Glenn Greenwald explains this as “human shame [being] a powerful
motivator” [43]. For example, people usually reveal different information about them-
selves to a doctor than they would to their employers. Being anxious that information
given to a doctor could at a certain point reach one’s employer, would keep people
from trusting their doctor. Hence, from a sociological perspective the lack of privacy
will change interactions within a society as the trust level decreases [70]. This also
has a great impact on democracy, if politicians can be blackmailed by institutions in
possession of their personal data.
A third argument is that the power of interpretation of data is given to the entity
in possession of it. In extreme cases an individual has no opportunity to clarify things
and correct misinterpretations. This is in particular the case if the victim does not
even know that data about her is collected.
One could assume that it is sufficient to obscure one’s identifier, i.e. stripping off
one’s name from a data set, reaching what is called pseudonymity. Yet, patterns
and data sets can be combined to identify an individual, who a data set belongs
to. Sweeny found that in the US knowing someones ZIP code, his gender and date
of birth is sufficient to uniquely identify 87% of Americans. Doing so she identified
William Weld’s (Massachusetts’ governor at that time) pseudonymous health record
in the data set of the Group Insurance Comission (GIC) [98].
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Especially in an era where vast amounts of computing power are available, the
sorting and interpretation of data becomes easier. A general solution is to force
companies by law to delete customer data after a certain time. However, there is
no guarantee for customers that the law cannot be suddenly changed. The easiest
solution to combat these uncertainties is to build systems that protect a customer’s
privacy inherently, meaning by design.
1.3 Organization and Contribution of this Dissertation
Electronic cash, short e-cash, which maps physical cash into the digital world, has
been introduced in 1982 by David Chaum as a means of secure and privacy-preserving
electronic payments [24]. Following his approach e-cash has become an area of cryp-
tographic research interest and many schemes were proposed, e.g. [10, 21, 22, 23, 26].
However, while e-cash seems to solve the issue of privacy in electronic payment sys-
tems, e-cash schemes require the execution of computationally expensive public-key
operations. This can be a limiting factor in terms of usability, especially considering
that potential payment devices are usually constrained in size and power and thus in
computational capabilities. In this dissertation we focus on the specific case of using
e-cash to solve the issue of privacy in the domain of transportation payments. We
investigate the usability of specific e-cash schemes through practical analyses, i.e. we
develop highly efficient implementations of e-cash schemes on potential payment de-
vices and evaluate their efficiency and usability. This requires highly efficient imple-
mentations of the underlying cryptographic primitives. We base the implementations
on elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) and show various approaches to implement
ECC efficiently even on extremely constrained platforms. Yet, the contribution of
this dissertation is not limited to demonstrating and evaluating implementation re-
sults of a theoretical concept. We present a multitude of ideas of how e-cash can fulfill
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the unique requirements of transportation payment systems, thus demonstrating how
e-cash can be used in practice.
A central requirement for payment devices is that they work in a contactless fash-
ion, as contact-based payment devices conflict with the need for short transaction
times. Additionally, contactless payment devices greatly increase customer conve-
nience as they provide ease-of-use. The use of devices such as NFC-smartphones is
a promising solution, due to the facts that a user can use a single device for various
applications and a payment service provider only has to offer a software app rather
than a hardware token to users, which greatly decreases development and deployment
costs. However, it is often at least additionally desirable to offer (extremely) inexpen-
sive payment tokens. This greatly increases the number of users that can participate
in a payment system. Further, even if relying on powerful smartphones, it is desirable
to execute security-critical functions on secure hardware, such as the embedded se-
cure element of a smartphone. Those chips usually have similarly powerful hardware
as is used in smart cards. In this dissertation we consider both types of platforms.
The remaining part of this dissertation is organized as follows: We first give
an introduction into background knowledge, which is required for an understanding
of the rest of the dissertation, in Chapter 2. We introduce e-cash basics focusing
on techniques which are used in the schemes of which our implementation will be
presented subsequently. We then introduce elliptic curve cryptography (ECC), which
we based the implemented e-cash schemes on, as it is the most efficient established
asymmetric cryptographic primitive.
Texas Instrument’s MSP430 microcontrollers target low-power applications among
which are wireless sensor, metering, and medical applications. These are applications
in which a high level of security is required. While newer devices of the MSP430 family
have AES hardware accelerators that support 256-bit AES, many security services rely
on public-key cryptography. Curve25519, which builds on a 255-bit prime field, has
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been proposed as an efficient, highly-secure elliptic curve, extremely suitable for exe-
cuting the elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman key-exchange protocol. This protocol, which
was recently named X25519, essentially executes a variable base-point single-scalar
multiplication on Curve25519. Chapter 3 presents an implementation of X25519 for
MSP430X microcontrollers. To combat timing attacks, we completely avoid condi-
tional jumps and loads, making our software constant time. The scalar multiplication
makes excessive use of modular multiplications in the underlying prime field. Many
techniques have been proposed to efficiently implement modular multiplications on
microcontrollers with only limited computational capabilities. However, the effec-
tiveness of those techniques depends on the architecture of the processing unit. We
present a comprehensive evaluation of several implementation techniques of the mod-
ular multiplication and show which ones are favorable on the MSP430X under various
conditions. We further present implementation results of the Curve25519 scalar mul-
tiplication, where our best implementation requires 7 909 028 cycles on MSP430Xs
having a 16-bit hardware multiplier and in 5 332 487 cycles on MSP430Xs having a
32-bit hardware multiplier.
An electronic cash scheme, particularly known for its efficiency during the spend-
ing phase, was proposed by Stefan Brands in [21]. This scheme is highly attractive for
use in the domain of public transport, where the spending, which happens in front of
turnstiles, is extremely time constrained, especially during rush hours. In Chapter 4
we demonstrate that, using sophisticated implementation techniques, it is possible
to realize this e-cash scheme even on inexpensive payment tokens. We implement
Brands’ untraceable offline cash scheme for the Moo, a computational RFID-token,
which closely approximates hardware that could be used in low-cost payment devices.
The computation required for spending a coin can be executed in 13 ms on the Moo,
which meets real-world application requirements. The computation required for re-
ceiving an electronic coin is time consuming on the Moo, which suggests to limit the
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amount of coins that have to be spent for a fare. A solution would be to define zones
in a transportation system, and then build a ticketing system, where a coin is worth
a fare in a particular zone. It is however highly desirable to allow for flexible and
dynamic prices, e.g. to adapt a fare to the distance traveled and the transport condi-
tions. While a solution would be that a user could receive electronic coins as change,
Brands’ scheme makes it difficult to realize change in a privacy-preserving way. Ad-
ditionally, this would diminish the attractiveness of Brands’ scheme which is its user
side’s efficiency during the spending phase. Instead we show an implementation of
the privacy-preserving pre-payments with refunds (P4R) scheme, which targets the
specific requirements of public transportation systems. In this scheme an electronic
coin is worth the most expensive trip in a transportation system, requiring a user to
spend a single coin per trip. She then receives a refund based on her overpayment in
a privacy-preserving way.
An attractive feature of some e-cash schemes is that they support the encoding and
selective disclosure of users’ attributes into electronic coins. This allows for additional
features such as variable pricing (e.g. reduced fares for customers who can prove par-
ticipation in a discount program) and privacy-preserving data collection. Supporting
privacy-preserving data collection is essential in systems, where meaningful user data
helps to maintain and improve a system. Chapter 5 presents an efficient implementa-
tion of Brands e-cash [21] and Anonymous Credentials Light (ACL) [7] used as e-cash,
allowing the encoding of user attributes into electronic coins on an NFC-smartphone,
namely the BlackBerry Bold 9900. Near field communication (NFC) is a recent pop-
ular technology for contactless electronic payments. Due to the limitation of having
to use the BlackBerry Java API, we present a subtle technique to make use of the
ECDHKeyAgreement class that is available in the BlackBerry API (and in the API of
other systems) and show how the schemes can be implemented efficiently to satisfy
the tight timing imposed by the transportation setting. While we show that it is
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possible to execute both schemes efficiently on the BlackBerry Bold 9900, we recall
from above that in practice it is highly desirable to execute security critical parts of
payment applications on a secure device, such as a smartcard or the secure element of
a smartphone, instead of a smartphone’s main processor. A hurdle in practice is that
it is surprisingly difficult for researchers to have free access to smartcards or secure
elements, i.e. to program them using native code. UBM 21-Z48 cards from UbiVelox
support a variety of cryptographic primitives, in particular elliptic curve cryptogra-
phy, allowing the implementation of the considered protocols on them. We present
an implementation of both schemes on UbiVelox UBM 21-Z48 cards for two security
levels and show that when relying on a 160-bit elliptic curve, spending a coin, which
encodes two attributes that are not revealed, can be executed in less than 800 ms.
In Chapter 6 we examine e-Cash in the e-mobility setting. E-mobility is a promis-
ing transportation technology, especially in densely populated cities. A crucial factor
for user acceptance of e-mobility is the provision of a well functioning charging infras-
tructure that allows convenient use of electric mobiles. Reliable payment schemes to
pay for electricity play a major role in this respect. We target the problem of privacy-
preserving payments for the e-mobility domain in Chapter 6. As mentioned above, a
major drawback of Brands’ untraceable offline cash scheme is the difficulty of realizing
change in a privacy-preserving way. If trying to limit the number of coins that have
to be spent per payment, this is however a feature most wanted in a domain, where
the prices greatly vary, which is the case in the e-mobility domain. A solution to this
is the P4R scheme, mentioned above, which rather then relying on a user being able
to receive electronic coins as change, realizes a privacy-preserving refund system. We
show how P4R can be used to solve the issue of privacy in the domain of e-mobility
payments. Using the same payment scheme for public transportation payments and
payments in the e-mobility domain allows using the same payment service for both
types of transport, which presents a key factor in achieving customer convenience.
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We present a full implementation of our proposed solution on an NFC-smartphone,
namely the Google Nexus 5, which supports Android 4.4 KitKat. We analyze the per-
formance of our proposed scheme on this platform, demonstrating its attractiveness
for use in the e-mobility domain.
Finally, we conclude with a discussion of our results and analyses, and provide an




In this chapter we first review some basics of e-cash schemes in Section 2.1. The
e-cash schemes that we consider are based on arithmetic in cyclic groups G of prime
order q. We base the implementation of those schemes on elliptic curve cryptography
(ECC) of which we review basics in Section 2.2.
2.1 Electronic Cash
E-cash schemes allow secure and private electronic payments by providing simi-
lar security and anonymity as physical cash. The general e-cash concept, which is
illustrated in Figure 2.1, describes the interaction between three types of entities:
the bank B, users U , and shops S. The bank plays the role of the central authority
checking the correctness of payments. However, it does not act as a trusted author-
ity; security and privacy is ensured against all entities. Monetary value is represented
by electronic coins, which are generated through an interactive protocol between the
bank and a user during a process called withdrawal. In the schemes that we consider
in this dissertation a coin consists of a serial number, which is randomly chosen by a
user and blindly signed by the bank during the withdrawal process. That means it
is signed by the bank in a way that the bank afterwards does not know neither the
data it has been signing nor the signature it has produced. The serial number serves
to later on identify a coin and check whether it has been spent multiple times.
Blind signatures have two important properties, which (informally stated) are:







Figure 2.1. E-cash concept — A user receives electronic coins from the bank, which
is the only entity able to generate coins, during a process called withdrawal. He will
later use these coins to pay at a shop during a process called spending. The shop can
deposit coins it received from users over a period of time to its bank account.
• Unforgeability: Only the signer can generate blind signatures. Even though a
prover has received a multitude of blind signatures he should not be able to
generate blind signatures on his own.
These two properties are extremely important for the e-cash scenario, as they ensure
(i) that nobody but the bank, which is in possession of the secret blind signature key,
can generate electronic coins and (ii) that later on a bank cannot identify whom it
had given a particular coin to as it has not seen the data it has been signing. Yet,
as with any digital signature scheme, anyone who is in possession of the public key
of the bank can verify the validity of the signature, i.e. the validity of a coin, offline,
without having to query the bank.
A user spends a coin at a shop. A mechanism is included that only allows someone
who knows the secret key of the user to spend a coin. In a correctly set up system this
should only be a user himself. The shop accepts the payment as long as the signature
is valid; it cannot check whether a coin had been spent before.
At a later point in time the shop deposits the coins that it received from users to its
bank account. The bank has a database collecting all used coins and checks, whether
a deposited coin had been deposited before. If so it further checks whether a shop
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deposited the same coin twice or whether a user double-spent the coin. Therefore a
user’s ID is blindly encoded in a coin in a way that, as long as the user uses the system
correctly, i.e. spends each coin only once, his identity remains hidden. However, if he
uses the same coin multiple times, his ID can be revealed from the transaction data
of the coin. This mechanism is called double-spending detection.
2.1.1 E-cash from (Blind) Digital Signatures
Blind digital signatures are based on digital signatures, which were introduced by
Diffie and Hellman in 1976 [32]. Digital signatures fulfill the same properties as writ-
ten signatures: anyone can easily verify a signature’s authenticity and it is infeasible
for an attacker to forge it, i.e. generate a valid signature on his own. Signatures can
be constructed based on public-key cryptosystems. A signer with private key skS and
public key pkS can generate a signature σ(msg) on the message msg by decrypting
the message with her secret key σ(msg) = decryptskS (msg). Using the signer’s public
key pkS , anyone can verify the signature on msg by checking, whether
msg ?= encryptpkS (σ(msg)). (2.1)
As described in [25] digital signatures can be used to construct a secure online
electronic cash system, which, however does not preserve a user’s privacy. To with-
draw a coin, U generates a random serial number SN, signs it with her private key,
and sends SN as well as the signature σU(SN) to B. B validates the signature σU(SN)
using U ’s public key, signs SN using its own private key and debits U ’s account. It
returns the signed coin σB(SN) to the user. Data could be communicated over an
encrypted channel such that an attacker A cannot steal a coin by intercepting the
communication. However, doing so would still not account for the fact that A could
spend U ’s coins, if he could retrieve them from the device in which they are stored.
A mechanism would have to be used, which only allows U to spend withdrawn coins.
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This could be done by not removing U ’s signature from the coin and adding the
bank’s signature to it. S would then require U to authenticate himself, i.e. to prove
knowledge of his secret key, during spending and then check both signatures. To
execute a payment U transfers the required amount of coins to S. After verifying the
signatures S sends the coins to B. B verifies the signatures and checks whether the
coins had already been spent before. If they had not been spent it sends a signed
deposit receipt to S and marks the coins as deposited. S returns goods to U together
with a digitally signed receipt.
In this system U cannot generate coins without B and cannot use a coin multiple
times. Additionally she cannot deny the withdrawal of coins from her bank account, as
she provided a signature on a generated serial number. B cannot deny the generation
of coins since it digitally signed them. Also B cannot deny that it accepted coins
from S, since it handed a digitally signed deposit receipt to S. S cannot deny that it
received a payment as U received a digitally signed receipt. However, as mentioned
above, this system does not provide customer privacy.
Blind signatures allow the introduction of customer privacy into the electronic
cash scheme presented above. The concept of blind signatures was introduced by
David Chaum in 1982 [24]. The idea is that before sending a generated serial number
SN to the bank, U blinds it using a random challenge c(SN) such that B cannot learn
anything about SN. B signs this blinded serial number σˆ(c(SN)), debits U ’s account,
and sends the signature σˆ(c(SN)) back to the user. U strips off the blinding factor
c−1(σˆ(c(SN))) = σ(SN) and checks whether the resulting signature is a valid signature
on SN (SN ?= σ−1(σ(SN))). He can use this coin to pay at a shop. After receiving a
coin S checks its validity and sends σ(SN) to B. Note that B has neither seen SN nor σ
before and hence cannot link the deposited coin to one that it gave out to a particular
user. B also verifies the validity of the coin and further queries its database to check
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whether this coin has been spent before. If not, it accepts the payment, deposits the
money into S’s account, and informs S that it accepted the payment.
This blind signature concept can serve to construct privacy-preserving online pay-
ment systems. Yet, it is often desirable to further support offline verification of pay-
ments. This can be achieved by forcing U to reveal particular partial information
about himself during a payment in a way that the provided partial information does
not reveal anything about U unless he uses the same coin again, in which case the
two chunks of information can be combined to reveal his identity. In this scenario it
only has to be verified, whether a coin is valid, during a payment. Checking whether
U spent a coin multiple times, can be done at a later point in time. Since U ’s iden-
tity is revealed, if he misused the system, he can be penalized after the fact. This
double-spending detection concept was proposed as part of the concept of one-show
blind signatures by Chaum et al. in [26].
2.1.2 E-Cash Protocols
Based on one-show credentials e-cash schemes can be constructed, which include
the following protocols:
• Setup, in which system parameters are generated and the bank generates a
private and public key pair.
• Registration, in which a user registers at the bank. After authentication, e.g.
by means of a passport or credit card, the user generates a private and public
key pair and proves possession of his private key to the bank. The bank stores
the user information together with the user’s public key, to be later used for
identification purposes in case of fraud.
• Withdrawal, in which a user receives electronic coins (the currency in an elec-
tronic cash scheme) from the bank, which is the only entity able to generate
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these coins. The user’s bank account is debited the amount of money he received
as electronic coins.
• Spending, in which a user spends electronic coins to a shop in exchange for
goods. This process happens offline, i.e. a shop checks by cryptographic means
whether she received a valid coin from the user. She cannot check whether the
user has already spent the coin before.
• Deposit, in which a shop deposits coins she received from users to her bank
account. During this process the bank checks whether it receives a valid coin
from the shop and adds its value to the shop’s bank account. Later it checks
whether this coin had already been deposited before. If so, it executes the
double-spending detection protocol.
• Double-Spending Detection, in which the bank checks whether the shop is trying
to double-deposit a coin, or whether a user has double-spent a coin. If it detects
that a user has double-spent a coin, it reveals his identity from the coin.
2.2 Elliptic Curve Cryptography
Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) is the most efficient established asymmetric
cryptographic scheme, which has been independently proposed by Neal Koblitz in
1987 and by Victor Miller in 1986 [76]. Its efficiency results from the fact that, in
contrast to other public-key cryptosystems, the run-time of known attacks on ECC-
based cryptosystems grows exponentially with the bit length of the curve. Hence,
when compared to other asymmetric cryptosystems, the same security level can be
achieved with much shorter key lengths [84]. As such a 1024-bit discrete logarithm
(DL) based cryptosystem reaches a comparable security level to a 160-bit ECC-based
cryptosystem. While an operation on an elliptic curve requires multiple multiplica-
tions, squarings and additions in the underlying field, the reduction in field size, and
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thus the lower arithmetic complexity of operations in the underlying finite field, can
result in a much better over-all performance, especially on constrained microcontroller
architectures. For example, using the operand-scanning algorithm, 400 single-word
multiplications are required to multiply two 160-bit field elements on an 8-bit mi-
crocontroller. In comparison to this 16 384 word multiplications are required for the
multiplication of two 1024-bit words on the same platform, again using the operand
scanning algorithm. Thus, executing for example ten multiplications on a 160-bit
field requires one forth of the number of single-word multiplications compared to one
multiplication on a 1024-bit field. Another advantage is that due to the shorter key
lengths less data has to be communicated between protocol partners. This is par-
ticularly beneficial in areas, where the communication bandwidth is limited. Those
facts make the use of ECC desirable on platforms that are constrained in power
and computational performance, which is often the case for user devices in payment
systems.
We use elliptic curves that are defined over prime fields Zp. A prime field Zp
denotes the set of integers {0, 1, . . . , p − 1} in which addition and multiplication are
performed modulo a prime p. An elliptic curve is defined by the Weierstrass equation
y2 + a1xy + a3y = x3 + a2x2 + a4x+ a6 (2.2)
where a1, a2, a3, a4, a6 ∈ Z∗p, such that −d22d8 − 8d34 − 27d26 + 9d2d4d6 6= 0, with d2 =
a21+4a2, d4 = 2a4+a1a3, d6 = a23+4a6 and d8 = a21a6+4a2a6−a1a3a4+a2a23−a24 [46]. A
pair (x, y) where x, y ∈ Zp, which fulfills Equation 2.2, is called a point on the elliptic
curve.
The operation defined on an elliptic curve is the point addition. Looking at
an elliptic curve defined over the set of real numbers: To add the points P and Q
geometrically one draws a line through P and Q. The point, where this line intersects
E a third time is mirrored at the x-axis to reach the point P + Q. A special case
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of the point addition is the point doubling, in which a point is added to itself. To
double the point P geometrically, one draws the tangent line to the elliptic curve at
the point P . The point, where this line intersects the elliptic curve E a second time
is mirrored at the x-axis, to reach the point 2P [46]. The calculation rule to execute
an addition, doubling and the computation of the negative point on an elliptic curve
depends on the curve type and is summarized in a so-called group law.
Additionally, a point at infinity O is defined. Including this point at infinity the
set of points of an elliptic curve is denoted as E(Zp). Together with the addition
operation E(Zp) forms an abelian group G, which has the following properties:
• Closure: ∀ a, b ∈ G, a ◦ b ∈ G
• Associativity: a ◦ (b ◦ c) = (a ◦ b) ◦ c ∀ a, b, c ∈ G
• Existence of an identity: ∃ e ∈ G such that a ◦ e = e ◦ a = a ∀ a ∈ G
• Existence of inverses: ∀ a ∈ G ∃ b ∈ G such that a ◦ b = b ◦ a = e
• Commutativity: a ◦ b = b ◦ a ∀ a, b ∈ G.
If a protocol is designed for abelian groups, it requires at most the above mentioned
group properties and can thus be based on ECC.
Repeated execution of the point addition is called scalar multiplication Q = [k]P ,
where the point P = (x, y) is added to itself k − 1 times. The scalar multiplication
is the core operation of ECC, equivalent to the exponentiation in DL-based systems.
Hence, what is denoted as exponentiation in G in the protocols listed in this disser-
tation is executed as scalar multiplication on an elliptic curve E. Similarly, what is
denoted as a multiplication in G is executed as a point addition on E.
E(Zp) forms a finite group where the number N of elements is called the order of
E(Zp). For an element P ∈ E(Zp) the smallest integer t such that [t]P = O is called
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the order of P . t is always a divisor of N , and if it equals N then E(Zp) is called
cyclic group and P is called generator of E(Zp) [46].
The security of ECC-based cryptosystems and thus the security of e-cash schemes
that are based on ECC relies on the hardness of computing the discrete logarithm
in E(Z∗p). Given two points P,Q ∈ E(Zp), which are related through the equation
Q = [k]P , the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem (ECDLP) is defined as the
problem of finding the scalar k, such that Q = [k]P holds.
As mentioned above the core operation in ECC-based cryptosystems is the scalar
multiplication on an elliptic curve. The scalar multiplication is also the most time
consuming operation in an ECC cryptosystem, requiring a multitude of point addi-
tions. In order to reduce the number of point additions required to execute a scalar
multiplication, one writes the scalar in binary representation k = ∑n−1i=0 ki2i. Then
the scalar multiplication can be executed as
Q = [k]P =
n−1∑
i=0
[ki2i]P = [k0]P +2([k1]P +2([k2]+ · · ·+2([kn−2]P +2([kn−1]P )) . . . )),
which can be formulated as Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1: Left-to-right double-and-add algorithm for scalar multiplication
on an elliptic curve [46].
Input : k = (kn−1, . . . , k1, k0), P .
Output: Q = (xQ, yQ) = k ∗ P .
1 Q← O
2 for i = n− 1 downto 0 do
3 Q = 2Q
4 if ki = 1 then
5 Q = Q+ P
6 end
7 end
The issue with this algorithm is its timing variance. While a point doubling is
executed in every iteration, a point addition is only executed, if the scalar bit is one.
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The processing of this algorithm thus directly leaks information about the processed
scalar, which can be exploited using so-called timing attacks. An algorithm avoiding
this issue is the Montgomery powering ladder [71]. The Montgomery powering ladder
(Algorithm 2) executes a point addition and a point doubling in each iteration, making
it a regular algorithm for the scalar multiplication.
Algorithm 2: Montgomery Powering Ladder [71].
Input : k = (kn−1, . . . , k1, k0), P .
Output: Q = (xQ, yQ) = k ∗ P .
1 R0 ← O;R1 ← P
2 for i = i = n− 2 downto 0 do
3 if ki = 1 then
4 R0 ← R0 +R1, R1 ← 2R1
5 end
6 else





EFFICIENT IMPLEMENTATION OF HIGH-SECURITY
ELLIPTIC CURVE CRYPTOGRAPHY ON MSP430
MICROCONTROLLERS
In this chapter we present work, which has been published in [33] and [49]. The
results arose from collaborative work with Michael Hutter, Amir Moradi, and Peter
Schwabe. Results that were not developed by the author of this dissertation will be
clearly marked in the respective sections.
For the remaining part of this dissertation we present implementations of e-cash
schemes targeting the transportation domain, where a security level comparable to 80-
bit symmetric security is sometimes sufficient. However, there are applications, where
a high level of security is required even on extremely constrained devices. We thus
investigate the performance of high-security public-key cryptography on hardware
that could be used for such applications.
This chapter describes our implementation of Curve25519 on MSP430X microcon-
trollers. Texas Instruments designed MSP430 microcontrollers to target low-power
applications (they can be operated at voltages of 1.8 to 3.3 Volts) and advertises their
use in security-critical applications as for example the domain of medical devices [57].
Newer devices of the MSP430 family have AES hardware accelerators that support
256-bit AES. Yet, many security services that are desirable for wireless communica-
tion, especially in the domain of medical devices, rely on public-key cryptography.
This naturally raises the question about the performance of public-key cryptography
on MSP430 microcontrollers.
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Bernstein introduced the Curve25519 elliptic-curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) key
exchange protocol in 2006 [13]. It uses the Montgomery form of this curve, which
is defined over a 255-bit prime field and achieves a 128-bit security level. Mont-
gomery curves are known to allow for very efficient x-coordinate-only variable-base-
point single-scalar multiplication, which makes their use highly attractive for ECDH
key-exchange schemes.
We present a full implementation of the Curve25519 Diffie-Hellman key-exchange
scheme, recently named X25519, on MSP430X microcontrollers. We differentiate
those MSP430Xs with a 16-bit and those with a 32-bit hardware multiplier and de-
veloped our code for both platforms. As all previous implementations of Curve25519
we use projective coordinates for the elliptic-curve point representation. The main
performance bottleneck of the variable-base-point single-scalar multiplication are then
modular multiplications in the underlying prime field. We hence put our focus on
optimizing the modular multiplication on the MSP430X architecture and give a com-
prehensive evaluation of different implementation techniques for MSP430X microcon-
trollers. We evaluate our implementation by executing it on Texas Instrument’s MSP-
EXP430FR5969 LaunchPad Evaluation Kit [60], which hosts an MSP430FR5969.
The MSP430FR5969 has a MSP430X CPU, 64 kB of non-volatile memory, 2 kB
SRAM and a 32-bit memory-mapped hardware multiplier [58]. We would like to
point out that this microcontroller is built into the WISP 5.0 UHF computational
RFID tag1, a device that operates based on harvested power from the RF field, which
indicates its ultra-low power nature. With a price of a few dollars, this microcontroller
is a suitable target for wireless sensor and medical applications.
We use the Montgomery powering ladder [71] to implement the scalar multipli-
cation on the elliptic curve, since this is a highly regular algorithm, making the
1http://wisp.wikispaces.com/WISP%205.0
24
executed computation independent of the scalar. Our software completely avoids
input-dependent loads and branches, thus executing in constant time and combating
timing attacks such as [4] or [102].
3.1 Related Work
Several implementations of ECC based on Curve25519 have been presented in
the literature. Various papers describe implementations of Curve25519 on powerful
processors [13, 29, 12], a recent publication describes an implementation on recon-
figurable hardware [91], and [61, 15] describes an implementation, which fits into 18
tweets. Only one prior implementation shows performance results of Curve25519 on
constrained devices, namely the implementation for 8-bit AVR microcontrollers by
Hutter et al. presented in [53], while no previous work has yet shown implementation
results of Curve25519 for 16-bit microcontrollers.
A plethora of literature exists on the implementation of ECC based on other el-
liptic curves on MSP430 microcontrollers. One of the first publications of ECC on
the MSP430 architecture is by Guajardo et al. in 2001 [44]. They presented an im-
plementation of a 128-bit elliptic curve and show that a scalar multiplication can
be performed within 3.4 million clock cycles. In 2007, Scott et al. presented opti-
mizations for finite-field multiplications underlying ECC [93]. Their 160-bit (hybrid)
multiplication method requires 1 746 cycles. In 2009, Szczechowiak et al. presented
pairing-based cryptography on the MSP430 [100]. Similar results have been reported
by Gouveˆa et al. in the same year [40]. They reported new speed records for 160-bit
and 256-bit finite-field multiplications on the MSP430 requiring 1 586 and 3 597 cy-
cles, respectively. They further presented an implementation of a 256-bit elliptic curve
random point scalar multiplication needing 20.4 million clock cycles, when relying on
the Montgomery powering ladder. In 2011, Wenger et al. compared ECC scalar mul-
tiplications on various 16-bit microcontrollers [106]. Their Montgomery-ladder based
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scalar multiplication needs 23.9 million cycles using a NIST P-256 elliptic curve. Also
in 2011, Pendl et al. presented the first ECC implementation running on the WISP
UHF RFID tag [78]. Their 192-bit NIST curve implementation achieves an execution
time of around 10 million clock cycles. They also reported first multi-precision mul-
tiplication results for 192 bits requiring 2 581 cycles. In 2012, Gouveˆa et al. reported
new speed records for different MSP430 architectures [41]. They improved their re-
sults from [40], namely, for the MSP architecture (with a 16-bit multiplier) their
160-bit and 256-bit finite-field multiplication implementations require 1 565 and 3 563
cycles, respectively.
Under the common assumption that the execution time of ECC grows approxi-
mately as a cubic function of the field size, our software outperforms all presented
constant-time ECC implementations on MSP430X microcontrollers in speed.
3.2 The MSP430X Microcontroller Architecture
The MSP430X has a 16-bit RISC CPU with 27 core instructions and 24 emulated
instructions. The CPU has 16 16-bit registers. Of those only R4 to R15 are freely us-
able working registers, and R0 to R3 are special-purpose registers (program counter,
stack pointer, status register, and constant generator). All instructions execute in
one cycle, if they operate on contents that are stored in CPU registers. However, the
overall execution time for an instruction depends on the instruction format and ad-
dressing mode. The CPU features 7 addressing modes. While indirect auto-increment
mode leads to a shorter instruction execution time compared to indexed mode, only
indexed mode can be used to store results back to RAM.
We consider MSP430X microcontrollers, which feature a memory-mapped hard-
ware multiplier that works in parallel to the CPU. Four types of multiplications,
namely signed and unsigned multiply as well as signed and unsigned multiply-and-
accumulate are supported. The multiplier registers are peripheral registers, which
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have to be loaded with CPU instructions. Which type of multiplication to be ex-
ecuted is selected by loading the multiplicand to one of the four registers (register
pairs for 32-bit multipliers) MPY, MPYS, MAC, and MACS which refer to unsigned mul-
tiply, signed multiply, unsigned multiply-and-accumulate, and signed multiply-and-
accumulate respectively. The multiplicand has to be loaded first. As soon as the
multiplier is loaded to the register OP2, the desired multiplication is executed. The
hardware multiplier stores the result in two (in case of 16-bit multipliers) or four (in
case of 32-bit multipliers) 16-bit registers. Further a SUMEXT register indicates for the
multiply-and-accumulate instruction, whether a multiplication has produced a carry
bit. However, it is not possible to accumulate carries in SUMEXT. The time required
for the execution of a multiplication is determined by the time that it takes to load
operands to and store results from the peripheral multiplier registers. The result of
a 16× 16-bit multiplication is available in 3 clock cycles on both types of MSP430X
devices, those that have a 32-bit hardware multiplier as well as those that have a
16-bit hardware multiplier (cf. [58] and [56]). Thus, our measurement results can be
generalized to other microcontrollers from the MSP430X family.
The MSP430FR5969 (the target under consideration) belongs to a new MSP430
series featuring Ferroelectric Random Access Memory (FRAM) technology for non-
volatile memory. This technology has two benefits compared to flash memory. It
leads to a reduced power consumption during memory writes and further increases
the number of possible write operations. However, as a drawback, while the maximum
operating frequency of the MSP430FR5969 is 16 MHz, FRAM can only be accessed at
8 MHz. Hence, wait cycles have to be introduced, when operating the MSP430FR5969
at frequencies higher than 8 MHz. For all cycle counts that we present in this chapter,
where we do not specify the operating frequency of the MCU, we assume a core clock
frequency of 8 MHz. Increasing this frequency on the MSP430FR5969 would incur a
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penalty resulting from those introduced wait cycles. Note, that this is not the case
for MSP430 devices that use flash technology for non-volatile memory.
3.3 Review of Curve25519
Curve25519 is an elliptic curve in Montgomery form. This curve has been carefully
chosen to provide very high performance for Diffie-Hellman key-exchange at the 128-
bit security level. It is defined by the equation y2 = x3 + 486662x2 +x over the prime
field Z2255−19. For details about the choice of curve and security see [13].
The key-exchange scheme computes a 32-byte shared secret Qx from a 32-byte
secret key n and a 32-byte public key Px. Here Qx and Px are x-coordinates of
points on the elliptic curve. At its core, the Curve25519 Diffie-Hellman key-exchange
scheme executes a variable-base-point single-scalar multiplication on the elliptic curve,
multiplying the public key Px with the secret scalar n, to obtain the shared secret Qx.
Special conditions are given for the secret scalar n, namely that the 3 least significant
bits and the most significant bit are set to zero, and the second-most significant bit
is set to one [14].
We follow the suggestions of [13] for implementing the variable-base-point single-
scalar multiplication on the elliptic curve. We use the Montgomery powering lad-
der [71] of 255 ladder steps. Each ladder step computes a differential point addition
and a point doubling. Starting with the points R1 and R2, in each ladder step either
R2 is added to R1 (R1 ← R1 + R2) and then R2 is doubled (R2 ← 2 · R2), or R1
is added to R2 (R2 ← R2 + R1) and then R1 is doubled (R1 ← 2 · R1). To avoid
conditional load addresses that can lead to cache-timing attacks, we execute the same
operations (R1 ← R1 +R2 and R2 ← 2 ·R2) in each iteration, and conditionally swap
the contents of R1 and R2 depending on the scalar bit b.
Note that for the conditional swap we do not use branch instructions. Instead,
this operation is implemented as follows: An unsigned variable bˆ is cleared. Then b is
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subtracted from bˆ leading to bˆ being 0 or 0xffff, depending on whether b is 0 or 1.
To swap the contents of x and y, an auxiliary variable is used to store tswp = x⊕ y.
tswp is ANDed with the value stored in bˆ, resulting in tswp = x ⊕ y for b = 1 and
tswp = 0 otherwise. Further tswp is XORed with x and y leading to either the original
values being stored in x and y for the case b = 0, or the swapped values for the
case b = 1. Together with the constant-time field arithmetic we thus obtain a fully
timing-attack protected constant-time implementation.
In [71] Montgomery presented x-coordinate-only doubling and differential-addition
formulas for points on an elliptic curve defined by an equation of the form By2 =
x3+Ax2+x. He showed the correctness of those formulas, which rely on the standard-
projective-coordinate representation of points, for the case of inputs not being equal
to the point at infinity. In the standard-projective coordinate system, a point is
represented by three coordinates, namely (X, Y, Z). This point corresponds to the
point (X/Z, Y/Z) in affine coordinates. In [13] Bernstein extended the proof of cor-
rectness of these x-coordinate-only doubling and differential-addition formulas to the
case of an input being equal to the point at infinity. Using these formulas, a dif-
ferential addition of two points requires 4 multiplications and 2 squarings. Point
doubling requires 2 multiplications, 2 squarings, and one multiplication by the con-
stant (486662 + 2)/4 = 121666. The differential-addition formula requires as input
the difference of the input points. If the Z-coordinate of this difference point is one,
the addition formula can be improved to require only 3 multiplications and 2 squar-
ings. Algorithm 3 summarizes the x-coordinate-only variable-base-point single-scalar
point multiplication on Curve25519 requiring 255 differential additions and doublings
(ladder steps), 255 conditional swaps, and one inversion at the end to transform the
result back to affine coordinates [13, 29].
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Algorithm 3: X-coordinate-only variable base-point single-scalar point multi-
plication on Curve25519 based on the Montgomery powering ladder [13, 29].
Input : Scalar n ∈ Z, Px, x-coordinate of point P .
Output: Qx, x-coordinate of point Q← n · P .
1 X1 ← Px;X2 ← 1;Z2 ← 0;X3 ← Px;Z3 ← 1
2 for i = 254 downto 0 do
3 if ni 6= ni−1 then
4 swap(X2, X3) /* This conditional swapping is implemented */
5 swap(Z2, Z3) /* in constant time. */
6 end
7 t1 ← X2 + Z2
8 t2 ← X2 − Z2
9 t3 ← X3 + Z3
10 t4 ← X3 − Z3
11 t6 ← t21
12 t7 ← t22
13 t5 ← t6 − t7
14 t8 ← t4 · t1
15 t9 ← t3 · t2
16 X3 ← (t8 + t9)2
17 Z3 ← X1(t8 − t9)2
18 X2 ← t6 · t7
19 Z2 ← t5(t7 + 121666t5)2
20 end
21 if n0 == 1 then
22 swap(X2, X3) /* This conditional swapping is implemented */
23 swap(Z2, Z3) /* in constant time. */
24 end
25 Z2 ← 1/Z2
26 return (X2 · Z2)
3.4 Implementation of Modular Arithmetic in Z2255−19
Algorithm 3 relies on addition, subtraction, multiplication, squaring and multi-
plication with a constant in the underlying prime field. Among those, multiplication
is the most time consuming operation and its careful implementation is thus of utter
importance. Many techniques have been proposed to improve the performance of
multi-precision multiplication implementations, especially for constrained devices. In
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the following we describe the techniques that we implemented and compared for the
MSP430X architecture in detail. To have a fair comparison, all methods were imple-
mented in assembly and were fully unrolled. We further present our implementation
of the other modular arithmetic operations.
3.4.1 Representation of Big Integers
We use an unsigned radix-216 representation for the product-scanning, operand-
caching [55] and the Karatsuba multiplication [54, 62], and a signed radix-2d255/26e
representation for the carry-save implementation. In unsigned radix-216 representa-
tion an n-bit integer A is represented as an array of m = dn/16e words in little-endian
order as (a0, a1, . . . am−1) such that A =
∑m−1
i=0 ai216i, where ai ∈ {0, . . . , 216 − 1}. An
element f in Z2255−19 is thus represented as f =
∑15
i=0 fi216i = (f0, f1, . . . f15). In radix-
2d255/26e representation an n-bit integer B is represented as an array of ` = d26n/255e
16-bit words in little-endian order as (b0, b1, . . . b`−1) such that B =
∑`−1
j=0 bj2d255j/26e,
where bj ∈ {−215, . . . , 215− 1}. Hence, in radix-2d255/26e representation an element in
Z2255−19 is represented using 26 16-bit words. Since inputs and outputs to the scalar
multiplication on Curve25519 are 32-byte arrays, conversions to and from the used
representations are only executed at the beginning and the end of the entire scalar
multiplication.
3.4.2 Multiplication Using Carry-Save Representation
This implementation follows the fast arithmetic implementation presented in [13].
A multi-precision integer is represented using the signed radix-2d255/26e representation:
B = b0 + b1210 + b2220 + b3230 + b4240 + b5250 + b6259 + b7269 + b8279 + · · ·+ b252246.
A benefit of this representation is that an addition or subtraction can be executed
without having to consider carry bits. It only requires pairwise addition or subtrac-
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tion of the respective coefficients, as long as the results of coefficient additions or
subtractions do not exceed the word-length.
h0 h1 h2 h3 h4 h5 h6 h7 …
f0 g0 f1 g0 f2 g0 f3 g0 f4 g0 f5 g0 f6 g0 f7 g0 …
38 f24 g2 f0 g1 f1 g1 f2 g1 f3 g1 f4 g1 2 f5 g1 f6 g1 …
38 f23 g3 38 f25 g2 f0 g2 f1 g2 f2 g2 f3 g2 2 f4 g2 2 f5 g2 …
38 f22 g4 38 f24 g3 38 f25 g3 f0 g3 f1 g3 f2 g3 2 f3 g3 2 f4 g3 …
38 f21 g5 38 f23 g4 38 f24 g4 38 f25 g4 f0 g4 f1 g4 2 f2 g4 2 f3 g4 …
38 f20 g6 38 f22 g5 38 f23 g5 38 f24 g5 38 f25 g5 f0 g5 2 f1 g5 2 f2 g5 …
38 f19 g7 19 f21 g6 19 f22 g6 19 f23 g6 19 f24 g6 19 f25 g6 f0 g6 f1 g6 …
38 f18 g8 38 f20 g7 19 f21 g7 19 f22 g7 19 f23 g7 19 f24 g7 19 f25 g7 f0 g7 …
⁞ ⁞ ⁞ ⁞ ⁞ ⁞ ⁞ ⁞ …
Figure 3.1. Visualisation of computing the first coefficients of the array h← f × g
mod 2255 − 19 using the carry-save technique. The dark grey block originates from
reducing the double-sized array, which is the result of multiplying f with g, modulo
2255 − 19.
Figure 3.1 exemplary presents the steps executed to compute the first 8 coefficients
hi of the array h ← f × g mod 2255 − 19. After transforming an integer to radix-
2d255/26e representation, each coefficient bi of B is within the interval (−29, 29) or
(−210, 210). We precompute 2f and 19g to easily realize constant multiplication with
factors 2, 19, and 38. We then use the product-scanning technique to compute the
coefficients hi, interleaving the multiplication with the reduction, i.e. we compute a
coefficient and reduce it right away. For the computation of each hi, 26 products of
coefficients have to be added.
This type of implementation has two disadvantages on the MSP430X architecture.
First of all the MSP430X CPU has very few general-purpose registers, while the
inputs have to be loaded from four different arrays f, g, 2f and 19g. This makes
holding inputs in registers difficult, as many different operands have to be loaded for
computation of the various coefficients. Further, while we use indirect auto-increment
mode to access g and 19g, there is no indirect auto-decrement mode on the MSP430X
and we need to access the other inputs using the costly indexed mode. The other
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disadvantage is the highly complex reduction of a coefficient, requiring several shift
operations, which are expensive on MSP430X devices.
Since we could not achieve good performance results with this type of implementa-
tion, we tried to speed things up relying on the refined Karatsuba formulas presented
in [11]. A problem occurs when trying to add the low and the high part of B in
signed radix-2d255/26e representation. For example computing the coefficient of 240
cannot be executed by adding b4 and b16 as b16 would be the coefficient of 239. Our
solution to this was to represent elements using signed radix-2d256/26e representation
and rely on computations modulo 2256 − 38. Yet still, the disadvantages of this type
of implementation on the MSP430X architecture dominate the advantages.
3.4.3 Operand-Caching Multiplication
Operand-caching was proposed by Hutter et al. in 2011 [55]. The idea of this
method is to reduce the number of load instructions by organizing the operations in
a way which allows using the same operands for multiple computations.
h0 h1 h2 h3 h4 h5 h6 h7 h8 h9 h10 h11 h12 h13 h14 h15
f0 g0 f1 g0 f2 g0 f3 g0 f4 g0 f5 g0 f6 g0 f7 g0
f0 g1 f1 g1 f2 g1 f3 g1 f4 g1 f5 g1 f6 g1 f7 g1
f0 g2 f1 g2 f2 g2 f3 g2 f4 g2 f5 g2 f6 g2 f7 g2
f0 g3 f1 g3 f2 g3 f3 g3 f4 g3 f5 g3 f6 g3 f7 g3
f0 g4 f1 g4 f2 g4 f3 g4 f4 g4 f5 g4 f6 g4 f7 g4
f0 g5 f1 g5 f2 g5 f3 g5 f4 g5 f5 g5 f6 g5 f7 g5
f0 g6 f1 g6 f2 g6 f3 g6 f4 g6 f5 g6 f6 g6 f7 g6
f0 g7 f1 g7 f2 g7 f3 g7 f4 g7 f5 g7 f6 g7 f7 g7
Figure 3.2. Toy-size example of the operand-caching multiplication, when 8 general-
purpose registers are available to hold operands. To compute the coefficients of the
array h ← f × g one first computes the light grey block keeping all required input
operands in general-purpose registers. Thereafter the dark grey area is computed.
Figure 3.2 shows a toy-size example of the operand-caching multiplication. Here
the execution of computations is divided into the light grey block, which is computed
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first, and the dark grey area, which is computed second. The empty dark grey and
light grey boxes represent space that is required for carry-bits.
As we have 8 general-purpose registers available for storing operands during the
execution of the multiplication, we chose the row size to be 4. Since each input
array has 16 elements, 16/4 = 4 rows have to be computed. One peculiarity of
the MSP430 hardware multiplier greatly improves the performance of the operand-
caching multiplication. In order to execute a multiply-and-accumulate operation, one
(two in the case of 32-bit multipliers) operand is loaded to the hardware multiplier’s
MAC register and the other to the OP2 register. Loading OP2 starts the execution
of the multiply-and-accumulate instruction. MAC does not have to be loaded again,
before another execution of the multiply-and-accumulate instruction, if the contents
of this register do not have to be changed. By ordering the multiplication instructions,
required for the computation of the coefficients of the resulting array, in a way that
input operands that have been loaded last to MAC during the computation of one
coefficient are processed first during the computation of the subsequent coefficient,
we can save on load operations to the multiplier registers. For example, if for the
computation of h1, as the final step f0 was loaded to MAC and g1 to OP2, then we start
the computation of h2 by loading g2 to OP2.
We first multiply both inputs f and g, resulting in a double-sized array and then
reduce this result modulo 2255 − 19. Since reduction modulo 2255 − 19 requires bit
shifts, we chose to reduce intermediate results modulo 2256 − 38 and only reduce
the final result of the scalar multiplication modulo 2255 − 19. We implemented two
versions of operand-caching multiplication, one making use of the 32-bit hardware
multiplier (in the following called 32-bit operand-caching) and the other only loading
16-bit inputs to the multiplier (in the following called 16-bit operand-caching).
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3.4.4 Product-Scanning Multiplication
To the best of the authors knowledge, the fastest previously reported result for
256-bit multiplication on MSP430X devices was presented by Gouveˆa et al. in [41].
In their work the authors have used the product-scanning technique for the multi-
precision multiplication. We thus also implemented this approach.
In our product-scanning implementation, where h = f × g mod 2256− 38 is com-
puted, we first compute the coefficients of the double-sized array, which results from
multiplying f with g and then reduce this result modulo 2256 − 38. We only have 7
general purpose registers available to store input operands during the multiplication
operation. Hence, we cannot store all input operands in working registers, but we
keep as many operands in them as possible. For the computation of a coefficient of
the double-sized array, which results from multiplying f with g, one has to access
the contents of f in incrementing and g in decrementing order, e. g. the coefficient
h2 is computed as h2 = f0g2 + f1g1 + f2g0. As there is no indirect auto-decrement
addressing mode available on the MSP430 microcontroller, we put the contents of
g in reverse order on the stack at the beginning of the multiplication, allowing us
to access g using indirect auto-increment addressing mode, which requires less clock
cycles than indexed addressing mode, for the remaining part of the multiplication.
h0 h1 h2 h3 h4 h5 h6 h7 …
f0 g0 f1 g0 f2 g0 f3 g0 f4 g0 f5 g0 f6 g0 f7 g0 …
f0 g1 f1 g1 f2 g1 f3 g1 f4 g1 2 f5 g1 f6 g1 …
f0 g2 f1 g2 f2 g2 f3 g2 2 f4 g2 2 f5 g2 …
f0 g3 f1 g3 f2 g3 2 f3 g3 2 f4 g3 …
f0 g4 f1 g4 2 f2 g4 2 f3 g4 …
f0 g5 2 f1 g5 2 f2 g5 …
f0 g6 f1 g6 …
f0 g7 …
Figure 3.3. Visualization of computing the first coefficients of h← f × g using the
product-scanning technique. We first compute the double-sized array, which results
from multiplying f with g and then reduce this double-sized array modulo 2256 − 38.
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3.4.5 Constant-Time Karatsuba Multiplication
This implementation is based on a very recent paper on the implementation of
multi-precision multiplication on AVR microcontrollers [54]. Karatsuba presented
a sub-quadratic multiplication method that reduces the number of required word
multiplications for multi-precision multiplications [62]. [54] builds on this idea leading
to a method named subtractive Karatsuba. This method avoids having to take extra
carry bits into account by computing |fl − fh| and |gl − gh| instead of fl + fh and
gl + gh, which facilitates to obtain a constant-time implementation. In the following
we report the method, as it was presented in [54], adapting it to the case of a 16-
bit architecture. The steps for multiplying two n-byte numbers, where in our case
n = 32, are described in detail and are summarized in Algorithm 4. Using a 16-bit
architecture, we have to process arrays of n/2 = 16 elements. We split those arrays
at k = 16/2 = 8.
Algorithm 4: Subtractive Karatsuba multiplication algorithm [54].
Input : f, g.
Output: h = f × g.
1 f` + 216kfh ← f
2 g` + 216kgh ← g
3 L← f` · g`
4 H ← fh · gh
5 M ← |f` − fh| · |g` − gh|
6 if M == (f` − fh) · (g` − gh) then
7 t = 0
8 end
9 else
10 t = 1
11 end
12 Mˆ = (−1)tM ;
13 return (L+ 216k(L+H − Mˆ) + 216n/2H)
We use the product-scanning technique for the computation of intermediate results
of the Karatsuba implementation, i.e., the computations of L, H, and M . For the
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computation of these we have seven working registers available to hold input operands.
Hence, we can store almost the full input that is accessed in decrementing order in
those working registers and access the eighth required operand of it using indirect
addressing mode. |f` − fh| is computed as follows: first we subtract with borrow all
elements in fh from those in f` and subtract with borrow from a register bF that was
cleared before. This results in bF = 0 for f` > fh and bF = 0xffff otherwise. We
XOR bF with f` − fh obtaining the ones-complement of f` − fh. We then compute
tF = bF AND 1 add this to the ones-complement of f` − fh and ripple the carry
through, obtaining the two’s complement of f`−fh, which is equal to |f`−fh|. |g`−gh|
is computed similarly. The value t required for the computation of Mˆ is obtained as
t = tF ⊕ tG. The same technique that was used to compute the absolute difference
above is used for the computation of Mˆ from M leaving out the initial subtraction
part. Again we computed the product of f and g resulting in a double-sized array
and reduced the result mod 2256 − 38.
3.4.6 Squaring
It turns out that on devices that have a 16-bit hardware multiplier, the constant-
time Karatsuba multiplication performs best (cf. Section 3.5). We thus use constant-
time Karatsuba in our implementation of squaring on MSP430X microcontrollers
that have a 16-bit hardware multiplier. Intermediate results are computed using the
product-scanning technique taking the aforementioned peculiarity of the MSP430’s
hardware multiplier unit, which is that contents of the hardware multiplier’s MAC regis-
ters do not have to be loaded again in case the processed operands do not change, into
account. This function executes in 2 427 cycles including function call and reduction
overhead and in 1 937 cycles without.
On devices that have a 32-bit hardware multiplier the product-scanning technique
performs better than constant-time Karatsuba, as it makes best use of the 32-bit
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multiply-and-accumulate unit of the memory-mapped hardware multiplier. In order
to compute h ← f 2 mod 2256 − 38, we first compute a double-sized array obtained
when squaring f and then reduce this result modulo 2256−38. During the computation
of f 2 we have 8 general-purpose registers available to hold input operands. We store
those operands of f that are accessed in decrementing order in working registers, and
access the other operands using indirect auto-increment addressing mode. Including
function call and reduction overhead our squaring implementation executes in 1 563
cycles on MSP430X microcontrollers that have a 32-bit hardware multiplier. Without
this overhead it executes in 1 174 cycles.
3.4.7 Addition, Subtraction, Reduction and Multiplication with 121666
The x-coordinate-only doubling formula requires a multiplication with the con-
stant 121666. The computation of h = f ·121666 mod 2256−38 greatly benefits from
the aforementioned peculiarity of the MSP430 hardware multiplier. In case of having
a 32-bit hardware multiplier we proceed as follows: The number 121666 can be writ-
ten as 1 · 216 + 56130. We store the value 1 in MAC32H and 56130 in MAC32L and then
during each iteration load two consecutive coefficients of the input array f , i.e. fi and
fi+1 to OP2L and OP2H for the computation of two coefficients of the resulting array
namely hi and hi+1. The array that results from computing f × 121666 is only two
elements longer than the input array, which we reduce as the next step. Using this
method, the multiplication with 121666 executes in 352 cycles on MSP430s that have
a 32-bit hardware multiplier, including function call and reduction overhead.
For the 16-bit hardware multiplier version, we follow a slightly different approach.
As we cannot store the full number 121666 in the input register of the hardware
multiplier, we proceed as follows: To compute h = f · 121666 mod 2256 − 38 we
store the value 56130 in the hardware-multiplier register MAC. We then compute each
hi as hi = fi · 56130 + fi−1 for i ∈ [1 . . . 15] such that we add the (i − 1)-th input
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coefficient to the multiplier’s result registers RESLO and RESHI. This step takes care
of the multiplication with 1 · 216 for the (i − 1)-th input coefficient. We further
load the i-th input coefficient to the register OP2, thus executing the multiply-and-
accumulate instruction to compute the i-th coefficient of the result. A special case
is the computation of coefficient h0, where h0 = f0 · 56130 + 38 · f15. This method
executes in 512 cycles including function call and reduction overhead.
The reduction of a double-sized array modulo 2256−38 is implemented in a similar
fashion. We store the value 38 in the MAC-register of the hardware multiplier. We
then add the i-th coefficient of the double-sized input to the result registers of the
hardware multiplier and load the (i+ 16)-th coefficient to the OP2-register. In the 32-
bit version of this reduction implementation the only difference is that two consecutive
coefficients can be processed in each iteration, i.e. the i-th and (i+ 1)-th coefficients
are added to the result registers and and the (i + 16)-th and (i + 17)-th coefficient
are loaded to the OP2-registers.
The modular addition h = f + g mod 2256 − 38, which executes in 186 cycles on
the MSP430X, first adds the two most significant words of f and g. It then extracts
the carry and the most significant bit of this result and multiplies those with 19. This
is added to the least significant word of f . All other coefficients of f and g are added
with carry to each other. The carry resulting from the addition of the second most
significant words of f and g is added to h15, which was computed first. Note that this
operation does not cause an overflow of h15 as its most-significant bit was extracted
before.
For the execution of h = f − g, g is subtracted with borrow from f . If the result
of the subtraction of the most significant words produces a negative result, the carry
flag is cleared, while, if it produces a positive result the carry flag is set. We add this
carry flag to a register tmp that was set to 0xffff before, resulting in the contents of
tmp to be 0xffff in case of a negative result and 0 in case of a positive result of the
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subtraction. We AND tmp with 38, subtract this from the lowest resulting coefficient
and ripple the borrow through. Again a possible resulting negative result of this
procedure is reduced using the same technique, minus the rippling of the borrow.
This modular subtraction executes in 199 cycles including function-call overhead.
3.5 Performance Analysis
We compiled our code using the C/C++ compiler [99], choosing the “high” profile
and optimizing for speed. Note that all functions implementing arithmetic in Z2255−19
were implemented in assembly, while higher level functions were implemented in C.
As a first step we simulated cycle-count estimates of our software given by the IAR
Embedded Workbench IDE. It turns out however that the IAR Embedded Workbench
IDE does not consider wait cycles, which are arise from using the hardware multiplier.
The IDE only gives cycle accurate estimates for functions executed by the main
CPU of the MSP430, whereas the memory-mapped hardware multiplier counts as a
peripheral of the MCU. To produce more accurate results, we measured the execution
time of all multiplication implementations on the MSP-EXP430FR5969 LaunchPad
Evaluation Kit [60] using the debugging functionality of the board and the IAR
Embedded Workbench IDE [99].
Performance results of the various modular multiplication implementations are dis-
played in Table 3.1 and visualized in Figure 3.5. Note that the MSP-EXP430FR5969
LaunchPad Evaluation Kit hosts an MSP430FR5969, which has a 32-bit hardware
multiplier. However, as mentioned in Section 3.2, a 16×16-bit multiplication executes
in the same number of clock cycles on an MSP430 with 32-bit hardware multiplier as
it would on an MSP430 hosting a 16-bit hardware multiplier.
We realized during our measurements that the speed of the implementation is not
doubled by increasing the operation frequency from 8 MHz to 16 MHz (Table 3.1).
This is due to the limited access frequency of the FRAM. The MSP430FR5969 relies
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Table 3.1. Measured cycle counts when executing the various multiplication imple-
mentations on the MSP-EXP430FR5969 Launchpad Evaluation Kit, operating the
microcontroller at 8 MHz and 16 MHz respectively. The numbers marked with (a)
include the function call and reduction overhead while those marked with (b) exclude
it.
# Method 8 MHz(a) 8 MHz(b) 16 MHz(a) 16 MHz(b)
1 16-bit Operand-caching 3 951 3 539 4 551 4 015
2 32-bit Operand-caching 2 541 2 119 2 879 2 399
3 16-bit Carry-save 7 230 7 2021 8 290 8 2571
4 16-bit Karatsuba 3 197 2 721 3 655 3 099
5 32-bit Karatsuba 2 233 1 843 2 494 2 049
6 16-bit Product-scanning 3 370 2 869 3 843 3 271
7 32-bit Product-scanning 2 082 1 678 2 293 1 836
1 Here the reduction step is not excluded as it is interleaved with the multiplication computation.
on Ferroelectric Random Access Memory (FRAM) technology for non-volatile mem-
ory. The FRAM has a maximum access frequency of 8 MHz. Hence, wait cycles must




















8 MHz 16 MHz


















8 MHz 16 MHz
(b) MSP430X with 32-bit hardware multiplier
Figure 3.4. Visualization of the execution times of the various multiplication imple-
mentations (Table 3.1) including function call and reduction overhead for (a) 16-bit
hardware multipliers and (b) 32-bit hardware multipliers on the MSP-EXP430FR5969
Launchpad Evaluation Kit. The methods are numbered according to Table 3.1.
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Table 3.2. Code space (in bytes) required for the variious modular multiplication
implementations (including reduction) on MSP430Xs obtained by the IAR Embedded
Workbench IDE.
# Method Code Space
1 16-bit Operand-caching 4 762 bytes
2 32-bit Operand-caching 2 878 bytes
3 16-bit Carry-save 8 448 bytes
4 16-bit Karatsuba 3 628 bytes
5 32-bit Karatsuba 2 322 bytes
6 16-bit Product-scanning 3 756 bytes
7 32-bit Product-scanning 2 088 bytes
We further present numbers for the required code space for the various multiplica-
tion implementations. Table 3.2 shows the required code space for each implementa-
tion obtained by the IAR Embedded Workbench IDE. It seems quite natural that the
version making use of the 32-bit hardware multiplier is faster and requires less code
space since fewer load (and store) operations to (and from) the dedicated registers of
the hardware multiplier have to be executed.
Table 3.3 displays the required stack space for each multiplication implementation,
which is the least for the operand-caching implementation. In terms of code space
and execution time the 16-bit Karatsuba implementation performs best for devices
that have a 16-bit hardware multiplier, whereas the Karatsuba implementation is
outperformed by the 32-bit product-scanning implementation for devices that have a
32-bit hardware multiplier available.
We further present cycle counts for the execution of the Curve25519 variable-base-
point single-scalar multiplication on the MSP430FR5969. We implemented scalar
multiplication for the cases of having a 32-bit and a 16-bit hardware multiplier. For
the 32-bit hardware multiplier case we used the product-scanning technique for the
implementation of the modular multiplication and squaring, whereas for the 16-bit
hardware multiplier case we used the subtractive Karatsuba technique for the imple-
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Table 3.3. Stack space required for modular multiplication implementations (in-
cluding reduction) on MSP430Xs obtained flushing RAM with a special character
and observing, which RAM contents have been changed after the execution of each
multiplication operation.
# Method Stack space
1 16-bit Operand-caching 182 bytes
2 32-bit Operand-caching 182 bytes
3 16-bit Carry-save 278 bytes
4 16-bit Karatsuba 210 bytes
5 32-bit Karatsuba 210 bytes
6 16-bit Product-scanning 214 bytes
7 32-bit Product-scanning 196 bytes
mentation of these modular arithmetic operations, as those are the fastest implemen-
tations for those cases according to Table 3.1.
On the MSP430FR5969 the scalar multiplication, which makes use of the 32-bit
hardware multiplier, executes in 5 332 487 clock cycles and requires 7.1 kB of code
space, whereas the 16-bit hardware multiplier version, executes in 7 909 028 clock cy-
cles and requires 10.4 kB of code space. Our results for Curve25519 on the MSP430X
microcontroller and a comparison with related previous work are summarized in Ta-
ble 3.4. We only list results that target reasonably high security levels.
3.6 Power Consumption Analysis
What is described in this part was executed by Amir Moradi and is stated here
to give a complete description of our results. We examined our code in terms of
power consumption on the MSP-EXP430FR5969 Launchpad Evaluation Kit. For
the power measurements we made use of a LeCroy WaveRunner HRO 66Zi digital
sampling oscilloscope. As the MSP-EXP430FR5969 Launchpad Evaluation Kit has
been developed to facilitate power measurements, we could easily place a 2.2 Ω shunt
resistor at the Vdd path of the MSP430FR5969 microcontroller while no stabilizing
capacitor was placed between the measurement point and the microcontroller. We
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Table 3.4. Cycle counts, code sizes and stack usage of elliptic-curve scalar-
multiplication software for MSP430X microcontrollers
CPU Curve Clk cycles Clk cycles Code Stack@8 MHz @16 MHz in bytes in bytes
With 16-bit hardware multiplier
[106] MSP430 NIST P-256 23 937 000 n/a n/a n/a
[105] MSP430 NIST P-256 22 170 000 n/a 8 378 418
[41, 42] MSP430X NIST P-256 7 284 377a n/a n/a n/a
This work MSP430X Curve25519 7 909 028 9 087 596 10 350 459
With 32-bit hardware multiplier
[41, 42] MSP430X NIST P-256 5 321 776a n/a n/a n/a
This work MSP430X Curve25519 5 332 487 5 968 096 7 116 457
a Note that the authors use the 4w-NAF method for the scalar multiplication, which does not
execute in constant time. In this chapter we focus on a constant-time implementation to
thwart timing attacks. Further the authors obtained some of the cycle counts using the IAR
Embedded Workbench simulator. It turns out that this simulator does not report correct
timings, if the memory-mapped hardware multiplier of the MSP430 is used.
powered the Evaluation Kit by an external stable power supply and monitored the
current passing through the shunt resistor by means of a LeCroy AP 033 differential
probe at a sampling rate of 1 GS/s.















Figure 3.5. A sample power trace measured from MSP-EXP430FR5969 Launchpad
Evaluation Kit when running 7 different multiplications
In Figure 3.6 we provide a zoomed view of a sample power trace to highlight
several—non-periodic—high peaks which we have observed. We have observed the
same peaks (but periodic) for a couple of NOP operations as well. The pattern of
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these high peaks differs for different sequences of operations. It turns out that those
peaks are due to FRAM accesses. FRAM reads are destructive, meaning that an
FRAM read has to be followed by a write operation to keep data in memory. Due to
the limited access frequency of the FRAM, TI has integrated a little cache allowing
to run the CPU at higher frequencies and not limiting it to the access frequency of
the FRAM. These peaks thus arise, if required data is not stored in cache (cache hit)
and the FRAM has to be accessed.
We observed the voltage at each sample point using the differential probe and
turned it into instantaneous power as P = V 2/R, where R = 2.2 Ω. The average of
the instantaneous power values over the period of time gives us the power consumption
of the device for that operation. We can turn this value to the amount of energy the
device consumed by integrating the instantaneous power consumption values over the
duration of an operation.
As stated above, using the 32-bit Karatsuba multiplication the debugging func-
tionality of the IAR Embedded Workbench IDE reports 5 332 487 clock cycles for the
execution of a scalar multiplication on Curve25519 on the board having a MSP430FR-
5969. We verified this result measuring the length of the power trace. Based on our
practical measurements one full execution of the algorithm takes around 672 ms with
operation frequency of 8 MHz. This confirms the cycle count measured with IAR
debugging functionality. To measure its power consumption we had to decrease the
sampling rate to 200 MS/s due to the length of the trace (672 ms). Based on 100 mea-
surements for random operands, in average the corresponding power consumption and
energy consumption is 14.0µW and 9.5µJ respectively.
3.7 Discussion
This Chapter presents a full constant-time implementation of Curve25519 MSP430-
X microcontrollers. In order to evaluate and improve the efficiency, we implemented
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and analyzed different finite-field multiplication techniques and compared them in
terms of speed and code size. Amongst all considered multiplication techniques,
the subtractive Karatsuba implementation proposed in [54] performs the best for
MSP430X devices that have a 16-bit hardware multiplier, while product-scanning
works best for devices that have a 32-bit hardware multiplier. We analyzed our im-
plementation with the MSP-EXP430FR5969 Launchpad Evaluation Kit. We further
presented numbers for the average power and the energy consumption of the execu-
tion of Curve25519 on this platform. We showed that with an energy consumption of




EFFICIENT E-CASH ON PASSIVE RFID TOKENS
TARGETING PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS
This chapter presents research, which has been published in [50, 86] and [87]. The
results arose from a collaboration with Foteini Baldimtsi and Andy Rupp. Results
that were not developed by the author of this dissertation will be clearly marked in
the respective sections.
In this chapter we focus on privacy-preserving electronic payments for public trans-
portation systems. A typical transportation payment system is sketched in Figure 4.1.
A user can buy tickets at vending machines and use those to pay for trips at turnstiles
at the entrance points of the transportation system. The payment process, i.e. giving
out tickets and collecting payments, is controlled by the transportation authority.
Figure 4.1. Overview of a public transportation payment system. A transportation
authority owns and controls vending machines, where users buy tickets, and turnstiles,
which a user can pass to access a transportation system, if he presents a valid ticket.
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To avoid congestion in front of turnstiles, especially during rush hours, trans-
actions have to be fast. A payment transaction should be executable within a few
hundred milliseconds, allowing users to pay “on the go”, i.e. when slowly passing
turnstiles. Transactions at the vending machines are less time-critical, but should
also not take longer than a few seconds, as this greatly reduces user convenience.
Vending machines and turnstiles, which are owned by the transportation authority,
are equipped with readers responsible for conducting payment transactions with user
devices. They can be equipped with powerful hardware, such as an ARM-processor
or a PC-like platform. While we assume that vending machines have a constant
connection to the back-end of the transportation authority, we do not expect that this
holds for turnstiles. For example in case of buses this connection can be interrupted,
which would impact the availability of payments if relying on it. We do however
claim that an intermittent connection between turnstiles and the back-end system is
available, enabling the transfer of payment data.
The use of smartphones as payment devices presents a promising solution. It
is however desirable to at least additionally offer (extremely) inexpensive payment
tokens. This greatly increases the number of users that can participate and provides
ease-of-use. Inexpensive tokens can provide an experience similar to traditional paper
tickets, while greatly adding convenience. Another central requirement for payment
devices is that they can communicate with turnstiles in a contactless fashion, because
contact-based communication conflicts with the need for short transaction times.
Note that this is not required during interaction with a vending machine, as processes
at the vending machine are less time critical. In this chapter we put our focus on
fairly low-cost platforms, such as RFID transponders, contactless or hybrid smart
cards, which are provided by the transportation authority.
We analyze the use of e-cash for payments in the public transport domain. E-cash
offers great advantages for customers. An important one is that a user does not need
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multiple payment devices to use transportation systems of different transportation
authorities. Rather he can withdraw electronic coins at one transportation authority
TA1 and use them to pay for a trip in the transportation system of TA2. Thus, TA1
would act as the bank and TA2 as a shop. TA2 can later deposit the received coins to
its account at TA1. This is achieved, as no trust between shops and banks is assumed
in the e-cash concept.
A particularly suitable electronic cash scheme for use in the domain of public
transport, because of its exceptionally efficient spending protocol, was proposed by
Brands’ in 1993 [21]. However, the withdrawal protocol of Brands’ scheme requires
the execution of several computationally expensive public-key operations on the user
side, which conflicts with the above mentioned resource constraints of user devices
and the real-time requirements of payment executions. In this chapter we practically
evaluate the usability of Brands’ untraceable offline cash scheme for use in public
transportation payment systems and demonstrate that through optimized implemen-
tation techniques we can combine the conflicting features of high computational re-
quirements with inexpensive contactless RFID tokens and short transaction times.
We present a full implementation of Brands’ e-cash scheme for a constrained
RFID token, namely the Moo device [107]. The Moo is a computational RFID tag
designed at the University of Massachusetts Amherst, which can communicate over
a distance of up to several meters. It operates in the UHF band with a center
frequency of 915 MHz and is passively powered, i.e., it does not rely on battery
power, but harvests its energy from the RF field presented by the RFID reader that
it communicates with. The Moo integrates the MSP430F2618 [56, 59], an ultra-low
power MCU from Texas Instruments. The MSP430F2618 has a MSP430X CPU,
8 kB of RAM and 116 kB of flash memory. While having a larger RAM and non-
volatile memory than the MSP430FR5969, which the investigations of Chapter 3
were based on, the MSP430F2618 has a 16-bit instead of a 32-bit memory-mapped
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hardware multiplier. Even though the Moo is an experimental device, it is a close
approximation of platforms that could be provided at low cost in future payment
tokens. Based on market prices of some contactless smartcards, it can be assumed
that if mass-produced, the price for a Moo will be in the range of a few dollars.
Our implementation, which builds on a 160-bit elliptic curve, shows that the
scheme is fairly efficient even on this, not for our purposes optimized, hardware. As-
suming a clock frequency of 4 MHz in contactless mode at turnstiles the computations
required for spending can be executed in 13 ms. The computation required for the
withdrawal process can be executed in 4.83 seconds on the Moo, if a core frequency
of 16 MHz is used. This is a reasonable assumption since a payment device could be
connected to a vending machine during the withdrawal process, thus allowing the pro-
vision of an external power source. By employing an ECC coprocessor as accelerator,
the runtime of the time consuming public-key operations could further be improved.
Nevertheless, the results indicate that the number of coins that have to be with-
drawn should be kept to a minimum, due to the time consuming withdrawal process.
A possibility is to build a ticketing system based on Brands’ scheme, where a coin
is worth one ticket and thus a single coin has to be paid for a fair. This however
conflicts with the desire of allowing variable and flexible prices, to e.g. account for
the distance a user has traveled or to allow for reduced fares in case of delays. Setting
the denomination of a coin to 1¢ certainly allows for flexible pricing but users would
need plenty of them to pay for a trip. Setting the value to $2 reduces the number
of required coins per trip but severely restricts the system of fares. A system would
be imaginable, in which the transportation authority would pay electronic coins to
a user as change. However, this cannot easily be achieved with Brands’ scheme in a
privacy-preserving way, which will be explained in more detail at a later point in this
chapter.
50
Instead we follow an alternative approach, namely the privacy-preserving pre-
payments with refunds scheme (P4R) [86], specifically designed for transportation
payment systems. In P4R which builds on Brands’, an electronic coin is worth the
most expensive trip in a system. At an entrance turnstile a user pays with a coin,
allowing him to use the transportation system. Her actual fare cost is determined
on the fly at an exit turnstile, when she leaves the transportation system. She then
receives a refund based on her overpayment in a privacy-preserving way. We im-
plemented this scheme on the same RFID token Moo and show its suitability as a
promising solution for a privacy-preserving public transportation payment system,
allowing dynamic and flexible prices.
4.1 Related work
The application domain of public transportation payment systems as an area of
cryptographic research interest was proposed by Heydt-Benjamin et al. in [48]. It dif-
fers from other application areas in that payment collection costs need to be kept very
low, while allowing for sufficiently secure payments. The authors propose the use of
recent advances in anonymous credentials and e-cash systems, which can detect fraud
while maintaining the anonymity of the honest user. In [89] Sadeghi et al. discuss
an electronic public transport payment scheme based on RFID tokens. Relying on
anonymizers their scheme protects the privacy of users against outsiders, but not
against the transportation authority. Their argumentation is based on the idea that
public-key cryptography cannot be executed efficiently on low-power devices such as
RFID tokens. We argue that this assumption is not necessarily valid. We believe that
using an efficient protocol, combined with advanced implementation methods will en-
able the use of electronic cash for public transportation payments. Blass et al. [17]
proposed another offline “privacy-preserving” payment system for transit applica-
tions. This system solely relies on a 128-bit hash function and lots of precomputed
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data on the back-end’s side. However, again their system does not protect a user’s
privacy from the transportation authority.
An implementation of a payment scheme that is based on Brands’ offline cash
scheme is shown in [27], where a Sharp-Zaurus5600 PDA is used as the target plat-
form. This is quite a powerful platform compared to what can be expected as payment
devices for public transport ticketing. In contrast we use a passively powered device
that approximates cheap payment tokens.
There have been several implementations of anonymous credentials on smartcards
as for example [9] and [16]. There the authors tailor the protocol to the platform since
no direct access to the integrated hardware is possible. In contrast we implement and
evaluate a full-size e-cash scheme and avoid any changes to the protocol.
4.2 Review of Brands’ Untraceable Offline Cash Scheme
This section briefly reviews basics of Brands’ e-cash scheme. Note that in our
scenario the vending machines represent the bank B, i.e. they have access to keying
material to generate blind signatures on coins, whereas turnstiles represent shops S,
which validate and accept payments.
Brands’ e-cash scheme is set up by choosing a cyclic group G of prime order q,
generators g, g1, g2 ∈ G, and a collision-resistant hash function H : {0, 1}∗ → Z∗q. The
bank’s secret key is skB ∈R Z∗q and its corresponding public key is pkB = gpkB .
To register for the payment service, a user U authenticates to the bank B by
means of presenting some authentication document as for example a passport. She
then chooses a secret key skU ∈R Z∗q and forms a public key pkU = gskU1 . If gskU1 g2 6= 1
she sends her public key pkU to the bank, which stores it together with identifying
information of the user. The bank further computes z = (pkUg2)skB , which it sends
to the user.
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To initiate a withdrawal process, in which a user receives electronic coins from the
bank, the user first authenticates to the bank through proving knowledge of her secret
key. To generate an electronic coin, the withdrawal protocol shown in Table 4.1, in
which a user receives a blind signature on some coin data, is executed between the
user and the bank. This coin data is essentially a serial number SN, which is randomly
chosen by the user and encoded in a serial number tag A. The user further generates
a blinding factor B, which she can later use to prove possession of the coin. The
bank signs the serial number tag and the blinding factor in a way that the user gets
a valid signature Sign(A,B), while the bank does not know neither A nor B nor the
signature Sign(A,B). The user only accepts, if a valid coin has been generated during
the protocol execution.
Table 4.1. Brands’ withdrawal protocol [21]. In this protocol the user randomly
chooses a serial number SN and encodes it in a serial number tag A. A and a blinding
factor B, which is also formed by the user are blindly signed by the bank.
U B
w ∈R Zq
SN∈RZ∗q, x1, x2, v∈RZq, u∈RZ∗q a,b←−−−−− a = gw, b = (pkUg2)w
A = (pkUg2)SN, B = gx11 gx22
z′ = zSN
a′ = augv, b′ = bSNuAv
c′ = H(A,B, z′, a′, b′)
c = c′/u c−−−−−→
gr
?= pkcBa
r←−−−−− r = cskB + w
(pkUg2)r
?= zcb
r′ = ru+ v
After execution of the withdrawal protocol the user knows a valid representation of
a coin, which consists of the tuple A,B, Sign(A,B) = (z′, a′, b′, r′). She will store the
coin in her electronic wallet together with the values SN, x1 and x2, which she will later
need to spend the coin. Anyone in possession of the bank’s public key can verify the
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signature, i.e. the validity of the coin, by computing the value c′ = H(A,B, z′, a′, b′)
and checking Equation 4.1.
Verify Sign(A,B) : gr′ = pkBc
′
a′ and Ar′ = z′c′b′. (4.1)
The user initiates a spending process by sending a coin A,B, Sign(A,B) to a shop.
The spending process can be executed offline, meaning that no connection to the back-
end system of the bank is required. Allowing payments to be verified offline is highly
desirable for public transportation payment systems, due to the above mentioned fact
that turnstiles do not have a constant connection to the transportation authority’s
back-end system. The shop validates Sign(A,B) and asks the user to prove ownership
of the coin. In order to do so the user proves in zero-knowledge using the generated
blinding factor B that she knows skU and SN which are encoded in A. The shop can
only verify the validity of the coin and that the user possesses it. Only the bank,
which collects all spent coins in a database, can check whether it had been spent
before.
A double-spending detection mechanism is used to detect, if a user used the same
coin multiple times. During the spending process a user is forced to reveal partial
data about herself by computing the values r1 and r2. This partial information by
itself reveals nothing about her identity unless she spends the same coin again. In
that case the bank can combine the two partial information sets and reveal the user’s
identity. The shop stores the received coin together with the values r1, r2 and ts. The
spending protocol between the user and the shop is shown in Table 4.2. Here IDS
denotes the shop ID and ts denotes a time stamp.
To deposit a coin to his bank account a shop sends the payment transcript
A,B, Sign(A,B), r1, r2 and ts to the bank. The bank computes d = H(A,B, IDS , ts)
and verifies the validity of the received coin. It then searches for this coin in its
database of deposited coins. If it cannot find that this coin has already been de-
54
Table 4.2. Brands’ spending protocol [21]. In this protocol the user sends a coin to
a shop, which checks its validity as well as whether the user is in possession of it. It
accepts the payment, if both checks hold.
U S
A,B,Sign(A,B)−−−−−−−−−−→ A ?6= 1
r1 = d(skU SN) + x1 d←−−−−−−−−− d = H(A,B, IDS , ts)






posited, it accepts the deposit, credits the shop’s bank account and stores the pay-
ment transcript A, r1, r2, d in its database. If it finds A in its database this can have
two reasons: (a) if d = d′ the shop is trying to double-deposit the coin and (b) if
d 6= d′ a user double-spent the coin. In case (b) the bank can reveal the cheating




This scheme does not provide an easy way of realizing a privacy-preserving change
system. A scenario is imaginable in which the user and the shop would switch roles
and the shop could thus pay electronic coins to the user as change. If however the
shop would act as a data broker and reveal to the bank its generated serial numbers of
coins, the bank can identify which shop generated a particular electronic coin when
it is deposited by a user. This entirely invalidates the privacy mechanisms of this
e-cash scheme. Especially in the public transport domain, where the transportation
authority owns vending machines and turnstiles, a transportation authority would
know which turnstile had generated a particular serial number of a coin.
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4.3 Implementation of Brands’ E-cash on the Moo RFID Tag
Our implementation focuses on the withdrawal and the spending processes, as
those are the time-critical parts that have to be executed frequently. While the
execution of the withdrawal protocol is more efficient on the bank’s side where only
two exponentiations have to be executed in contrast to 12 exponentiations that have
to be executed on the user’s side, the spending protocol is extremely efficient on the
user’s side. Here only two modular additions and three modular multiplications have
to executed in contrast to seven exponentiations that have to be executed on the
bank’s side.
We base the scheme on ECC since it is the most efficient established asymmetric
cryptographic scheme, especially if compared to classical discrete logarithm (DL)
based systems. This is due to the fact that, in contrast to DL and factoring-based
public-key cryptosystems, the run-time of known attacks on ECC grows exponentially
with the bit-length of the curve. Thus the same security level can be achieved with
much shorter key lengths [84]. This can reduce the number of required computations
and the amount of data that has to be communicated between protocol partners.
As we target a low-value payment system we conclude from [20] that basing the
system on a 160-bit elliptic curve presents sufficient security, i.e. the efforts for break-
ing the system are high compared to the benefits that would be gained from it.
To further increase security, system keys could be updated regularly. For our im-
plementation we use the 160-bit prime curve secp160r1 suggested by an industry
consortium [82]. The underlying prime field Zp of this curve is based on a gener-
alized Mersenne prime p = 2160 − 231 − 1 which allows for an efficient implementa-
tion of the curve arithmetic. The curve is given in short Weierstrass representation
E : y2 = x3+ax+b where a, b ∈ Zp, such that 4a3+27b2 6= 0. The group G, generated
by the base point P , is a cyclic group of prime order suitable for an implementation
of Brands’ offline cash scheme.
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4.3.1 Implementation of the Zp Framework
Similarly to what was presented in Chapter 3 we use an unsigned radix-216 repre-
sentation as this makes best use of the 16-bit CPU of the MSP430F2618. An element
in Zp is thus represented as an array of 10 words. We put our focus on the optimiza-
tion of multiplication and squaring in Zp, as those will be used extensively in the
implementation of the point multiplication in the ECC-framework.
Both functions implement two steps. In the first step the hybrid multiplication
algorithm with d = 2 as proposed in [45] is used to compute a double-sized array,
as the result of a multi-precision multiplication or multi-precision squaring of the
input elements. This can be efficiently implemented, making use of the multiply-
and-accumulate instruction of the hardware multiplier unit of the MSP430F2618. To
achieve best performance we implemented these functions in assembly. The result-
ing double-sized array is reduced using the fast reduction of NIST-primes method
described in [46].
To illustrate the reduction step let us assume the computation of h = f 2 mod p,
where f is an array of ten 16-bit words f = f92144 +f82128 + . . .+f1216 +f0. Here the
coefficient fi denotes the integer that is stored in the i-th element of the array. The
result hˆ of squaring f is an array of 20 elements hˆ = hˆ192304+hˆ182288+. . .+hˆ1216+hˆ0.
Using the fast reduction of NIST-primes [46], the reduction h = hˆ mod p is computed
as
h =[hˆ9 + hˆ19 + (hˆ17>>1) + (hˆ18<<15)]2144 + . . .+ [hˆ4 + hˆ14 + (hˆ12>>1) + (hˆ13<<15)]264
+[hˆ3 + hˆ13 + (hˆ11>>1) + (hˆ12<<15) + (hˆ19>>2)]248
+[hˆ2 + hˆ12 + (hˆ10>>1) + (hˆ11<<15) + (hˆ18>>2) + ((hˆ19<<14) & 0xc000)]232
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+[hˆ1 + hˆ11 + (hˆ10<<15) + (hˆ10<<5) + (hˆ19>>1) + ((hˆ18<<14) & 0x8000)]216
+hˆ0 + hˆ10 + (hˆ19<<15) + (hˆ18>>1),
where j>>x denotes a logical right shift of x by j bits and x<<j a logical left shift
of x by j bits, while & denotes a bit-wise AND operation.
4.3.2 Implementation of the ECC Framework
Our implementation of the scalar multiplication on secp160r1 relies on the Mont-
gomery powering ladder [71]. Note that in contrast to Chapter 3, where we imple-
mented the Curve25519 Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) key exchange protocol, we cannot
rely on x-coordinate only scalar multiplication algorithms in the context of this im-
plementation. Only the x-coordinate of the resulting point of a scalar multiplication
is required to be used as shared secret of the ECDH key exchange as the y-coordinate
provides only one extra bit of information. In contrast the y-coordinate of the result
of a scalar multiplication is required for further protocol computations of Brands’
scheme as multiple point multiplications and additions are executed.
Our scalar multiplication implementation is based on what was described in [84].
We rely on Jacobian coordinates for the point representation P = (X, Y, Z). (X, Y, Z)
is equivalent to the point (x, y) = (X/Z2, Y/Z3) in affine coordinates. Using this
representation of points, an inversion I can be exchanged for several modular mul-
tiplications M and squarings S. As can be seen in Table 4.3 the inversion is much
more time consuming than multiplications and squarings, making the use of Jacobian
coordinates advisable. Using Jacobian coordinates a point doubling can be compute
at the cost of 4M+6S+8A, while point addition requires 12M+4S+7A [84].
In [68] Meloni proposed an optimization for the point addition in Jacobian coor-
dinates for the case, when two points share the same Z-coordinate, the so called co-Z
addition requiring only 5M+2S+7A. It turns out that the Z-coordinate of an input
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point can be updated to match the Z-coordinate of the resulting point at no extra
cost [84]. Given two input points P = (XP , YP , Z) and Q = (XQ, YQ, Z), their sum
R = (XR, YR, ZR) = P +Q can be computed as
XR = D− (B+C), YR = (YQ−YP )(B−XR)−E and ZR = Z(XQ−XP ), (4.2)
where A = (XQ−XP )2, B = XPA, C = XQA, D = (YQ− YP )2 and E = YP (C −B).
P can be updated as P = (E,B,ZR), such that it shares the same Z-coordinate with
R [84], allowing repeated co-Z addition.
It was further shown in [39] that Rˆ = (XRˆ, YRˆ, ZR) = P − Q, sharing the same
Z-coordinate with R, can be computed at little extra cost as [84]
XRˆ = F − (B + C) and YRˆ = (YP + YQ)(XRˆ −B)− E, (4.3)
where F = (YP + YQ)2. The computation of R = P + Q and Rˆ = P − Q together,
where R and Rˆ share the same Z-coordinate requires 6M+3S+16A and is named
conjugate co-Z addition.
The Montgomery powering ladder requires a point addition and subsequent point
doubling, e.g. R = P + Q and Rˆ = 2P in each iteration. This can be achieved with
the above presented formulas (Equations 4.2 and 4.3) by first executing a conjugate
co-Z point addition, resulting in R1 = P + Q and R2 = P − Q, and a subsequent
co-Z addition with update on those results, i.e. R = R1 and Rˆ = R1 + R2 = 2P ,
where the Z-coordinate of R1 is updated to be the same as that of Rˆ.
Note further from Equations 4.2 and 4.3 that the Z-coordinate of the input points
is not required for the computations of XR, YR, XRˆ and YRˆ. Repeated point additions
can thus be executed without computing the Z-coordinate which further reduces the
number of required operations. Yet, the Z-coordinate is needed at the end of the
algorithm to transform the resulting point back to affine coordinates. The interested
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reader is referred to [84] for detailed explanations on how the Z-coordinate of the
resulting point can be recovered at the end of the Montgomery powering ladder. The
idea is that after each iteration it holds that the difference between R and Rˆ is the
input point P of which the affine representation is known. Due to x = X/Z2 and
y = Y/Z3 it holds that Z = xY/yX.
All ideas combined can be used to achieve an efficient algorithm for point multi-
plication, shown as Algorithm 9 in [84], which we used for our implementation of the
ECC framework on the MSP430F2618.
4.3.3 Implementation of the Zq Framework
Brands’ scheme requires operations in the finite field that is generated by the
prime order q of G. We use an unsigned radix-216 representation for elements in Zq
requiring 11 words for the representation of one element. The form of the prime,
which is the order of the chosen elliptic curve, is not suitable to use the special NIST-
reduction technique, which was used for reduction in the Zp framework. Instead we
implemented Barrett reduction as presented in [69] as an efficient method to reduce
elements in Zq.
4.3.4 Implementation of a Hash Function
A hash function is required for the implementation of Brands’ scheme that takes
as input several points on the elliptic curve and returns as output an element in
Z∗q. To ensure that the output of the hash function lies in Z∗q we seek for a 160-bit
output instead of 161 bits, which for the chosen curve is the bit-length of q. Further
a coordinate on the elliptic curve is 160-bit in length. We hence seek for a hash
function that takes 160-bit inputs and produces a 160-bit output, where we only
process x-coordinates of points as inputs to the hash function.
We implemented the block cipher based hash function AES-hash [28]. Inputs are
hashed block-wise using the previously hashed block as input and the to be hashed
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Table 4.3. Timings of the Zp, Zq, and ECC framework, and the Hash functions H
Function Cycle count Execution time Execution time
@16 MHz @4 MHz
Reduction in Zp 384 0.02 ms 0.10 ms
Multiplication in Zp 2, 266 0.14 ms 0.57 ms
Squaring in Zp 1, 678 0.11 ms 0.42 ms
Inversion in Zp 190, 294 11.90 ms 47.60 ms
Reduction in Zq 11, 648 0.73 ms 2.91 ms
Multiplication in Zq 17, 101 1.07 ms 4.27 ms
Rijndael160 10, 785 0.67 ms 2.69 ms
H 54, 958 3.43 ms 13.70 ms
Point addition 196, 059 12.30 ms 49.00 ms
Scalar multiplication 6, 312, 785 395.00 ms 1, 578.00 ms
block as key to the Rijndael block cipher [30]. The block ciphers output is XORed with
the previously hashed block.
4.4 Performance of Brands E-Cash on the Moo RFID Tag
We developed our code and analyzed its performance using the IAR Embedded
Workbench IDE for MSP430 v 5.40. We wrote higher-level code in C and sped up
time critical functionality of Zp using assembly language. In Table 4.3 timings for
the implementation of the underlying primitives of the e-cash scheme are presented.
As expected the special form of the prime, which the elliptic curve is based on, leads
to a very efficient reduction and such to a fast execution of the multiplication and
squaring in Zp.
Table 4.4 shows the execution times of the user side’s computation of Brands’
scheme. The results have been simulated for two frequencies, namely 4 MHz and
16 MHz. Our implementation is designed for the Moo, which operates at 4 MHz,
due to the limited power that is available when relying on harvested power from the
RF-field. However, the MSP430F2618 can be operated at a maximum frequency of
16 MHz. This could be achieved when providing the platform with an external power-
61
Table 4.4. Timing results of the user sides’ computation of Brands’ offline cash
scheme on the MSP4302618
Cycle count Withdrawal 77,292,874
Cycle count Spending 52,050
Execution time Withdrawal @ 4 MHz 19.30 s
Execution time Spending @ 4 MHz 0.013 s
Execution time Withdrawal @ 16 MHz 4.83 s
Execution time Spending @ 16 MHz 0.003 s
Table 4.5. Code size of the user sides’ implementation of Brands’ scheme on the
MSP430F2618
CODE CONST DATA
Zp framework 5, 912 228 20
Zq framework 2, 308 158 22
ECC framework 3, 088 120 20
Hash function 2, 578 308 256
Protocol User 560 − −
source. During the time-critical spending operation, which happens at turnstiles, we
require a contactless operation of the Moo. The more computationally intensive part
of Brands’ scheme however is the withdrawal phase. During the withdrawal process
the Moo could be connected to a vending machine thus allowing the higher operating
frequency of 16 MHz.
The timings for the spending meet real-world requirements even for high-throughput
transportation situations. An option would be to execute the withdrawal of coins at
home, where the user connects the payment device to his personal computer and
leaves it there for the charging period. In that case the withdrawal would not be
very time-critical. Yet, there are several advantages of executing the withdrawal at
a vending machine located near the entrance points of the public transportation sys-
tem. Therefore the withdrawal (even of several coins) needs to be executable within
a couple of seconds. However, during charging the payment device, it can be con-
nected to the charging station allowing it to be supplied by an external power source
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which supplies the passive tag with sufficient energy to power additional hardware
accelerators.
The results indicate that Brands’ scheme is a suitable solution for privacy-preserving
payments in the public transport domain, even when relying on payment devices that
are extremely constrained in computational power, if the number of coins that have
to be spent for a fare is low. The scheme could serve as a ticketing system, where a
user pays for a fare with a single coin. By using several blind signature key pairs at
the bank, different denominations could be offered for different zones that a user can
travel. However, as mentioned previously, it is highly desirable to allow for flexible
and dynamic prices, i.e. allowing a fare price to be adapted to the distance that a
user traveled. A system would be imaginable, where turnstiles would give out elec-
tronic coins to a user as change, which could again lower the number of coins that a
user would have to spend, but this cannot easily be achieved with Brands’ scheme.
A solution to this we further present an implementation of the privacy-preserving
pre-payments with refunds scheme (P4R).
4.5 Review of the Privacy-Preserving Pre-Payments with Re-
funds Scheme (P4R)
The privacy-preserving pre-payments with refunds scheme [86] has been developed
and its security has been analyzed by Andy Rupp and Foteini Baldimtsi. We will
briefly describe the scheme of which an implementation will be presented thereafter.
P4R is composed of a trip authorization token system (TAT), a refund calculation
token system (RCT) and a refund token system (RT). A TAT, which a user can
acquire at a vending machine, is a credential worth the most expensive fare and
allows a user to make an arbitrary trip in the transportation system. When entering
the transportation system the user shows an unused TAT where the showing does
not reveal his identity. However, the identity of the user is encoded in the TAT
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in a way that it can be revealed, if he is trying to use the same TAT to enter the
transportation system multiple times. If the TAT is valid the user is granted access
and he receives a stamped receipt RCT which contains a MAC on the spent TAT, the
date and time, and the ID of the entrance turnstile IDS . When leaving the system
the user presents his RCT which is used to determine the turnstile the user passed to
enter the transportation system and calculate his fare. To prevent that the user re-
uses an RCT and thus can claim a higher refund in future trips, the RCT is bound to
the ticket which a user has to present together with the RCT when claiming a refund
at an exit turnstile. This requires the double showing of a TAT without revealing
the user’s identity. A user accumulates refunds in a refund token RT. He presents
a blinded version of RT to the exit turnstile which adds the refund to it. When a
user decides to redeem the collected refund she presents her RT to a vending machine
which redeems the RT if it is not already marked as cashed in the database.
The TAT system is based on Brands’ e-cash scheme (cf. Section 4.2) adapted to
allowing the showing of an electronic coin twice (without revealing the identity of
the user). To achieve this a user generates two blinding factors B1 and B2 during
the withdrawal process and receives a signature Sign(A,B1, B2) on both. She can use
those to proof possession of the TAT in zero-knowledge twice, once using blinding
factor B1 and once using B2.
The refund token system builds on Boneh-Lynn-Schacham (BLS) signatures [19]
to ensure that only a signer (an entity in possession of the private BLS signature key)
can add refunds to a refund token. BLS signatures are based on bilinear pairings. Let
G and GT be cyclic groups of prime order q then a mapping e : G×G→ GT is called
bilinear pairing, if (i) it satisfies bilinearity: e(ga1 , gb2) = e(g1, g2)ab for g1, g2 ∈ G and
a, b,∈ Zq, (ii) it satisfies non-degeneracy: if g is a generator in G then e(g, g) 6= 1 and
(iii) it is efficiently computable: an efficient algorithm exists to compute e(g1, g2). In
the BLS signature scheme a signer randomly picks a secret key skS∈RZq and computes
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a public key pkS = gskS . A signature σ(msg) is generated as σ(msg) = msgskS and
can be verified by verifying whether
e(g, σ(msg)) ?= e(pkS ,msg).
In P4R a user receives a refund token RT = SNRT∈RG from the transportation au-
thority when withdrawing a number of coins. The transportation authority can add
a refund value w to this token as RT′ = RTskwS . Multiple executions of this equation





Assuming that users do not check collected refunds, which is reasonable in the
public transportation domain where refunds usually have low values, we do not need
to rely on a bilinear pairing group for the implementation of the refund token system,
as the only entity checking refunds is the transportation authority, who is in possession
of the secret BLS-signature key. We implemented the scheme for this scenario and rely
on the same ECC framework that was used for the implementation of plain Brands’
scheme.
The set-up and user registration of P4R are essentially the same as those of Brands’
scheme (cf. Section 4.2). During set up the transportation authority additionally has
to choose a message authentication code MAC and has to generate a MAC-key skMAC
and a BLS signature key skBLS, which it provides to its turnstiles.
To initiate the BuyTAT process, in which a user receives TATs and a fresh RT from
a vending machine, the user first proves knowledge of his secret key. For each TAT
he then executes the BuyTAT protocol (first part of Table 4.6), in which he receives a
blind signature on a generated serial number tag A and two blinding factors B1 and
B2. After execution of the BuyTAT protocol the user knows a valid representation of a
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TAT consisting of the tuple A,B1, B2, Sign(A,B1, B2) = (z′, a′, b′, r′). She stores TAT
together with the values SN, x1, x2, y1, y2 which she will use to spend the TAT later
on. She further receives a fresh refund token RT (second part of Table 4.6) which she
stores together with R, which is used to accumulate randomization values, and the
value of the refund token vRF, which is initialized to zero.
Table 4.6. P4R’s BuyTAT and GetRT protocol. In the BuyTAT protocol the user
randomly chooses a serial number SN and encodes it in a serial number tag A. He
further generates two blinding factors B1 and B2 and receives a blind signature from
the bank on A,B1 and B2. In the GetRT protocol the user receives a fresh RT.
U B
w ∈R Zq
SN∈RZ∗q, x1, x2, y1, y2, v∈RZq, u∈RZ∗q a,b←−−−−− a = gw, b = (pkUg2)w
A = (pkUg2)SN
B1 = gx11 gx22 , B2 = gy11 gy22
z′ = zSN
a′ = augv, b′ = bSNuAv
c′ = H(A,B1, B2, z′, a′, b′)
c = c′/u c−−−−−→
gr
?= pkcBa
r←−−−−− r = cskB + w
(pkUg2)r
?= zcb
r′ = ru+ v
RT = SNRT, R = 1, vRF = 0 SNRT←−−−−− SNRT∈RG, add SNRT to database
When the user enters the transportation system he executes the ShowTAT and
GetRCT protocols together with the turnstile (Table 4.7). The user first shows an
unused TAT and proves possession of it. If it is valid, i.e. Equation 4.1 holds, access
is granted and the user receives an RCT.
When leaving the transportation system, the user shows her RCT, and proves
possession of its contained TAT, this time using blinding factor B2. If it is valid the
refund amount w is calculated by the exit turnstile and added to to the randomized
refund token also presented by the user.
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Table 4.7. P4R’s ShowTAT and GetRCT protocol. In this protocol U presents a TAT
and S checks its validity as well as whether U possesses it. The payment is accepted,
if both checks hold and U receives an RCT.
U S
A,B1,B2,Sign(A,B1,B2)−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ A ?6= 1
r1 = d(skU SN) + x1 d←−−−−−−−−−−−−−− d = H(A,B1, B2, IDS , ts)
r2 = d SN + x2





RCT←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− RCT = (TAT, ts, IDS ,
MACskMAC(TAT, ts, IDS))
Table 4.8. P4R’s ShowRCT and GetRefund protocol. In the ShowRCT protocol the
user presents his RCT to the exit turnstile, which checks its validity and computes
the refund w the user should receive based on it. In the GetRefund protocol the user
presents a blinded version of her refund token and the turnstile adds w to it.
U S
A,B1,B2,Sign(A,B1,B2)−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ A ?6= 1
r′1 = d′(skU SN) + y1
d′←−−−−−−−−−−−−−− d′ = H(A,B1, B2, IDS , ts)
r′2 = d′ SN + y2
r′1,r
′








$← Z∗p w←−−−−−−−−−−−−−− determine refund w ∈ Zp−1
RT′ = RTr RT
′−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
vRF = vRF + w, R = Rr mod p RT
′′←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− RT′′ = RT′skwBLS
RT = RT′′
To redeem a refund a user randomizes her refund token and presents it to the
vending machine. If it belongs to this user, correctly encodes vRF and is not marked
as cashed in the database, the transportation authority returns the money to the user
and marks RT as cashed in its database.
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Table 4.9. P4R RedeemRT protocol
B U
rnd∈RZq
Check validity of SNRT
RT′,SNRT,vRF,R,ts,←−−−−−−−−−−−− RT′ = RTrnd, R = R× rnd
and whether it had been
given to this user
v
?






4.6 Performance of P4R on Moo RFID tag
We evaluate the scheme’s performance, by presenting implementation results of
the scheme for the Moo RFID tag [107] and estimating its required storage space.
We choose the same ECC framework for the implementation that we used for our
implementation of Brands (Section 4.3). For our storage estimation we assume affine
coordinate representation of points. We list how much storage space is required for
the different data bundles (Table 4.11).
Implementation results for the user side’s computation on the Moo are presented
in Table 4.10 for 4 MHz and 16 MHz. We note that ShowTAT & GetRCT and ShowRCT
& GetRefund are considered the time-sensitive operations as they happen during the
actual transportation, e.g., at a turnstile during rush hour. The results show that the
protocols for entering the system (ShowTAT & GetRCT) can be executed efficiently
even on the chosen unoptimized prototyping device. The execution time for receiving
a refund (ShowRCT & GetRefund) is more time critical, but could easily meet real-
world requirements, when making use of dedicated hardware or allowing for clock
rates higher than 4 MHz. The most time consuming, but also less time critical step
is buying TATs (BuyTAT). Yet, buying TATs is done at vending machines, where
the device could be physically connected to the machine and hence additional power
would be available to power hardware accelerators, that can speed up the execution of
an elliptic curve point multiplication by an order of magnitude or more, resulting in
68
Table 4.10. Timing results for the user side’s computation of The P4R protocols:
BuyTAT, GetRT, ShowTAT & GetRCT, ShowRCT & GetRefund and RedeemRT
Cycle Count Execution time Execution time
@ 4 MHz in s @ 16 MHz in s
BuyTAT 83,567,483 20.89 5.22
GetRT 242 ≈ 0 ≈ 0
ShowTAT & GetRCT 35,657 0.009 0.002
ShowRCT & GetRefund 5,786,013 1.45 0.36
RedeemRT 5,519,689 1.38 0.34
a total execution time of a second or less. Of course, this would increase the cost of a
payment device. However, in the case of millions of payment devices being rolled out,
which can be assumed for metropolitan areas, the cost of such dedicated hardware
would be reasonably low.
We assume the storage of points in affine coordinate representation, where each
coordinate is an element in the 160-bit field Zp. We thus require 40 bytes of storage
for an element in G. The order of the group generated by the base point of secp160r1
spans a 161-bit prime field Zq. We thus require 21 bytes for storing an element of
Zq. Based on these parameter choices, our storage space estimations for P4R are
summarized in Table 4.11. The total storage requirements on a user device to make
20 trips is at most 1× 0.06 kB + 20× 0.37 kB + 1× 0.12 kB + 1× 0.04 kB = 7.62 kB.
A user’s secret key comprises of two elements, an element in G and one in Zq,
which requires 61 bytes of storage. This data is generated once, when the user opens
an account and will not be deleted for the lifetime of the user device. For each TAT
6 elements in G and Zq have to be stored respectively. This sums up to 0.37 kB of
data that has to be stored for each TAT and can be deleted after using it. To collect
refunds the user receives a refund token and maintains some other associated data,
consisting of two elements in G and two in Zq, which requires 0.12 kB of storage.
This data can be deleted when redeeming the refund. Please note that refunds are
accumulated using the 161-bit variable vRF, which leads to a more than sufficiently
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Table 4.11. Storage space estimation for payment data in P4R
Elements Storage Comments
pkU , skU IDU , gIDU1 0.06 KB Stored once
TAT Ai, Bi, Ci,Sign(Ai, Bi, Ci) 0.37 KB Can be deleted after use





RT RT, SNRT, R, v 0.12 KB One for a bundle of TATs
RCT MACK(TATi, ts, IDR), IDR, ts 0.04 KB Stored only during a trip
large upper bound for the refund amount. During a trip, an RCT token has to be
stored. The TAT belonging to this RCT is already contained in the memory of the
user device and does not require any extra storage. We estimate ts and IDS to require
10 bytes of memory each, while storing MACK(TAT, ts, IDS) requires 21 bytes, which
adds up to additional 41 bytes of data.
We further estimate the size of the four databases required for P4R. The user
database stores identifying information for each user along with his public key and is
a comparably small database. The TAT database and the RCT database keep track
of the used TATs and RCTs of a user, in order to detect double-spending. Here we
store the values A, z1, z2 per TAT and A, z′1, z′2 per RCT, which results in 82 bytes per
TAT and RCT token, respectively. Additionally, the transportation authority uses an
RT database to store all RTs. Per RT token a serial number is stored along with a
boolean value, indicating whether this RT has been redeemed, resulting in 41 bytes
per RT.
Let us now consider an average ridership of 1.28 million passengers per day, which
was the case in the MBTA system in Boston in February 2013 [67]. Then the TAT
and the RCT databases grow by 105 MB per day or 38.3 GB per year, respectively.
Assuming that on average a user buys bundles of 10 TATs and uses a single RT token
per bundle to collect the corresponding refunds, 47 million RTs are issued per year.
This results in a growth rate of 1.9 GB of storage per year. Thus, the overall storage
requirements for the databases involved in our system are pretty modest. Also, note
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Table 4.12. Comparison of Brands’ e-cash for coins with a denomination of 10 cents
and P4R (for MSP430 operating at 4 MHz when user enters/leaves and at 16 MHz
when he charges his payment device)
Charging Enter Exit
device System System
Arbitrary trip in P4R 5.22 s 0.009 s 1.45 s
$1 trip with Brands’ e-cash 42.57 s 0.081 s -
$2.30 trip with Brands’ e-cash 98 s 0.19 s -
$4.90 trip with Brands’ e-cash 209 s 0.40 s -
that the size of these databases can be limited by changing system parameters on a
regular basis or restricting the lifetime of TAT and RT tokens by attaching expiration
dates.
4.7 Performance Comparison of P4R with Brands’ E-cash
In this section, we briefly compare the performance of P4R and the transporta-
tion payment system directly built from Brands’ e-cash, when allowing prices of fares
to be flexible. We consider Brands’ e-cash with only a single and small denomina-
tion value to allow for flexible pricing and avoid the problem of overpayments and
privacy-preserving change. Of course we could allow Brands’ coins to have different
denominations however it would still not be a single coin per trip as in P4R. A further
benefit of e-cash with refunds is that, as a trip is charged at the end of a trip, a truly
flexible pricing scheme can be applied, i.e. lower prices on overcrowded buses. With
Brands’ e-cash the cost for a trip would have to be determined on entrance of the
system.
Table 4.12 shows the performance of both schemes for different fares assuming
Brands e-coins with a denomination of 10 cents. Clearly, the runtime of withdrawal
and spending in Brands’ scheme grows linearly with the number of required coins and
thus with the fare of a trip, whereas in P4R we have a constant runtime independent
of the fare. Last, assuming an average fare of $2.50, the database for Brands’ scheme
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(required for double-spending detection) would grow by 957.8 GB each year compared
to 78.5 GB in total per year for all three databases required for the P4R scheme.
4.8 Discussion
We presented an implementation of Brands’ offline cash scheme for a computa-
tional RFID tag. Spending is considered the time-sensitive operation as this happens
during the actual transportation, e.g., at a turnstile during rush hour. The achieved
spending timings meet real-world application requirements even for high throughput
transportation situations. The withdrawal of coins could be done at home, where the
user connects the payment token to his personal computer, and leaves it there for the
charging period. In that case the withdrawal would not be very time-critical. Yet,
there are several advantages of the withdrawal taking place at charging stations lo-
cated near the entrance points of the public transportation system. In that case, the
withdrawal (even of several coins) needs to be executable in a couple of seconds. Yet,
during withdrawal the payment device could be connected to the charging station,
which supplies the passive tag with sufficient energy to power additional hardware
accelerators, which could greatly speed up execution timings.
Nevertheless, the results of the implementation of Brands’ scheme advise that
the number of coins that a user has to withdraw to make a fare has to be kept to a
minimum, which conflicts with the desire to allow for flexible and dynamic prices. This
can be solved relying on the privacy-preserving pre-payments with refunds scheme,
which was designed to target the specific requirements of the public transportation
setting. We presented an implementation of this scheme and compared our results
with the implementation of Brands’ scheme. Our results demonstrate that lightweight
e-cash schemes do present an attractive solution for privacy-preserving payments




IMPLEMENTATION OF E-CASH WITH ATTRIBUTES
FOR PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS
In this chapter we present work, which has been published in [52] and was extended
in [51]. The results arose from collaborative work with Foteini Baldimtsi, Felix Riek
and Christian T. Zenger. Results that were not developed by the author of this
dissertation will be clearly marked in the respective sections.
Another attractive feature of some e-cash schemes is that they allow the encoding
of user attributes into electronic coins. An attribute could for example be the user’s
age, zip code, or his eligibility to receive a discount. The user can selectively disclose
an attribute when spending an electronic coin, meaning he can decide while spending
an electronic coin, whether he would like to reveal a particular attribute or not. This
mechanism is highly attractive for payment systems in the transportation domain as
it (i) can be used to realize discount systems, i.e. a user receives a discounted fare, if
he is in possession of an attribute proving his participation in the discount program
and (ii) privacy-preserving data mining, i.e. the collection of meaningful data about
customer behavior in the system. For a transportation authority it is highly desirable
to collect user data to maintain and improve a transportation infrastructure based on
users’ needs. The encoding and selective disclosure of user attributes allows collecting
user data in a privacy-preserving way as it allows a coarse-grained collection of user
data, without revealing the identity of the user. In particular, it allows a user not to
participate in the data collection at any time, if he does not feel comfortable sharing
information in a particular situation.
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In this chapter we extend our considerations of the previous chapter using e-
cash in the public transport domain, presenting an implementation of two e-cash
schemes, which allow the encoding and selective disclosure of user attributes, on
potential payment devices that suit the transportation setting. We consider Brands’
untraceable offline cash scheme [21] and Anonymous Credentials Light (ACL) [7] used
as e-cash.
To satisfy the tight timing requirements imposed by the transportation setting, we
choose a payment device that can communicate with an access point in a contactless
fashion. A standard for contactless communication integrated in modern smartphones
is Near Field Communication (NFC) [1]. It allows a smartphone to communicate with
other NFC-enabled devices within a range of a few centimeters. While the throughput
is moderate, the benefit of this type of communication is its simple and hence fast
establishment, as electronic devices can be connected with a simple touch. There are
predictions that in the long run NFC devices will replace the multitude of smartcards
that many users carry around currently. For transportation authorities the advantage
of relying on users’ NFC-enabled smartphones is that no additional (electronic) tokens
will have to be handed out. Instead only a software-app has to be provided that the
user can download to his phone. This contributes to decreasing the revenue collection
cost, and further allows the payment system to be updated easily. If a change to the
system is made, the transportation authority only needs to provide a software update,
rather than a hardware roll-out.
Our implementation is based on elliptic curve cryptography (ECC). As smart-
phone we use the BlackBerry Bold 9900 featuring a Qualcomm Snapdragon MSM8655
processor running at 1.2 GHz. It is equipped with the operating system BlackBerry
OS 7 and is programmed using Java SDK API 7.1.0 provided by Research in Motion
(RIM). We show how the schemes can be implemented efficiently using the func-
tionality that is provided by the BlackBerry Java API since version 3.6.0. We have
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developed a subtle technique that enables us to use the ECDHKeyAgreement class,
which is present in this and other Java APIs, for computing the scalar multiplication
on an elliptic curve. While developed and shown for this device, the use of this tech-
nique is not limited to the BlackBerry Bold 9900. It can be applied to devices that
support efficient implementations of ECC, but only allow access to most commonly
used results, as ECDH key agreement or ECDSA (as for example some Java smart
cards). While the ECDH key agreement essentially executes a scalar multiplication,
the APIs often only give access to the x-coordinate of the resulting point, since only
this is needed as shared secret. Our technique shows, how to efficiently recover the
y-coordinate for those cases. We show that both schemes execute efficiently on the
BlackBerry Bold 9900, while a limiting factor is the NFC-communication bandwidth.
For employment it is however highly desirable to execute payment applications on
a secure device, such as the SIM card or the embedded secure element of a smartphone,
instead of a smartphone’s main processor. Those devices are usually equipped with a
relatively small microprocessor, similar to hardware that can be found in smartcards.
Access to SIM cards or embedded secure elements is highly restricted, such that it is
difficult for researchers to implement protocols on them. As an additional hurdle in
practice, is it surprisingly difficult for researchers to have free access to smartcards,
i.e. to program smartcards using native code. Usually, if at all, only high-level ac-
cess is provided [101]. This has made it quite difficult to analyze the performance
of non-standard cryptographic protocols on smartcards. While certain cryptographic
primitives (such as AES or 3DES encryption), which are required for many security
applications, are supported by many smartcard APIs, advanced cryptographic proto-
cols, especially those requiring the execution of computationally complex arithmetic,
cannot easily be implemented on these platforms in an acceptable execution time.
The ST23ZL48 is a microcontroller from STMicroelectronics for secure smartcard
applications [97]. This chip is integrated in Ubivelox MULTOS smartcards, namely
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UBM21-Z48 cards1, whose API supports ECC functionality. We present an imple-
mentation of the same e-cash schemes allowing the encoding of attributes on this
off-the-shelf smartcard. Our implementation demonstrates that Brands’ untraceable
offline cash scheme [21] and the Anonymous Credentials Light scheme (ACL) [7] sup-
porting the encoding of two attributes into coins can be implemented efficiently on
low-cost smartcards in practice meeting the stringent timing requirements of modern
payment systems. Our implementation on a UbiVelox MULTOS smartcard achieves
an execution time of the time-critical spending phase in 800 ms for both schemes.
5.1 Related Work
Multiple works present an implementation of anonymous credentials on smart-
cards. Bichsel et al. presented an implementation of the Camenish-Lysyanskaya anony-
mous credential system on a Java Card [16]. However, their best result requires more
than 7 seconds for the issuance of a credential. Sterckx et al. presented an imple-
mentation of the Direct Anonymous Attestation scheme on Java Cards [95], where
their execution of the signing protocol requires 4.2 s. Vullers et al. presented an im-
plementation of an Idemix based credential scheme on a MULTOS smartcard, which
they called IRMA card [104]. When encoding two attributes, their implementation,
which is based on a 1024-bit modulus, executes in 1.1 s if not revealing an attribute
and 0.9 s, when revealing both attributes. Finally, Mostowski and Vullers presented
an implementation of the U-Prove system on MULTOS smartcards in [72]. Their is-
suance of a U-Prove token requires 3.6 s, when allowing the encoding of two attributes




Only few implementations of full e-cash schemes on mobile platforms exist. While
a variation of Brands’ untraceable offline cash scheme has been implemented on a
PDA by Clemente-Cuervo et al. [27], no implementation of ACL has been presented
in the literature.
5.2 Review of E-cash with Attributes
For completeness, we review the basics of the implemented protocols, namely
Brands’ untraceable offline cash scheme [21] and Anonymous Credentials Light (ACL) [7]
allowing the encoding of attributes, in this section. The description of those protocols
has been developed by Foteini Baldimtsi and was published in [52].
A transportation payment system based on e-cash is described as an interaction
between users U and a transportation authority. We envision the same scenario as
has been described in Chapter 4, depicted in Figure 4.1. We assume that a trans-
portation authority owns vending machines and turnstiles, where vending machines
have a constant connection to the back-end servers of the transportation authority,
and turnstiles have an intermittent connection. The vending machines together with
the back-end system of the transportation authority take the role of the bank B of an
e-cash scheme. Here a user can recharge his electronic wallet. Turnstiles, which are
positioned at the entrance points of a transportation system take the roles of shops
S, granting a user access, if he presents a valid ticket (electronic coin).
5.2.1 Brands’ E-cash Allowing the Encoding and Selective Disclosure of
Attributes
In Brands’ e-cash scheme [21] when allowing the encoding of attributes the bank
B chooses a cyclic group G of prime order q, and n + 2 generators of this group
g0, g, g1, g2, . . . , gn, where n is the number of attributes supported by the system.
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It further chooses a hash function H : {0, 1}∗ → Z∗q, and generates a key pair by
choosing a secret key skB ∈R Z∗q and computing its public key as pkB = gskB .
5.2.1.1 User Registration
To use the payment system, a user U has to register at the bank. To do so, he
presents some form of identification, e.g. a passport, and generates a commitment C
for his attributes L2, . . . , Ln ∈ Zq and his secret key skU = L1 ∈R Z∗q. His public
key is pkU = gskU1 . The user would either have to reveal his attributes to the bank
when committing to them or obtain them from some other trusted authority and then
prove knowledge of them to the bank. Then using a standard Schnorr AND proof
of knowledge [92] of several discrete logarithms, the user proves that he knows an
opening of the commitment C and that the same value L1 has been used to generate
C and pkU . The bank checks the validity of the proof, stores the user’s information
and computes z = (Ch)skB which it sends to the user. The user registration process
is summarized in Table 5.1.
Table 5.1. Brands’ with attributes user registration protocol
B U
skU = L1∈RZ∗q
C = gL11 . . . gLnn , pkU = gskU1
If C 6= 1:
w1, . . . , wn ∈R Zq
C′ = gw11 . . . gwnn , pk′U = gw11
k = H(C/pkU ,C′/pk′U , pkU , pk′U , ts)
s1 = w1 + kL1
C/pkU ,C′/pk′U ,pkU←−−−−−−−−−−−− ...
pkUkpk′U
?= gs11




of U together with C
z = (Cg0)skB z−−−−−−−−−−−−→ Store z
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5.2.1.2 Withdrawal
To withdraw coins the user first has to authenticate himself to the bank and claim
how many coins he wishes to withdraw. This is necessary as otherwise a user could
later deny his wish to withdraw electronic coins and further an attacker could initiate
the withdrawal process, harming the user by debiting money from his bank account,
if the user set up some direct debit service. Note that the attacker could not spend
the withdrawn electronic coins, as knowledge of the user’s secret key is required for
spending.
The user authenticates himself and claims, how many coins he wishes to with-
draw, by computing a Schnorr signature [92] σ(msg) on a message msg of the form:
msg =“N, ts”, where N is the number of coins he would like to withdraw and ts is a
time stamp. The bank will authorize the withdrawal process, if this signature verifies
under the user’s public key. The identification phase is presented in Table 5.2.




k = H(msg, gr1), y = r + skU × k
Check σpkU :
msg,σpkU (msg)←−−−−−−−−−− σpkU (msg) = (y, k)
H(msg, gy1pkUk )
?= k
For the withdrawal of each coin, the withdrawal protocol, summarized in Table 5.3
is executed. In this protocol a user generates a serial number SN, encodes it in a serial
number tag A, generates a blinding factor B, and receives a blind signature Sign(A,B)
on A and B from the bank. The blinding factor B encodes random values that a user
can use later on to prove possession of the coin, and possession of the respective
attributes.
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Table 5.3. Brands’ with attributes withdrawal protocol
B U
w ∈R Zq
a = gw, b = (Cg0)w
a,b−−−→ SN ∈R Z∗q
A = (Cg0)SN, z′ = zSN
x0, x1, . . . , xn, u, v ∈R Zq
B = Ax0gx11 . . . gxnn
a′ = augv, b′ = bSNuAv
c′ = H(A,B, z′, a′, b′)
c←−− c = c′/u mod q
r = cskB + w r−−→ gr ?= pkcBa, (Ch)r ?= zcb
r′ = ru+ v
For each coin, the user stores the values A,B, Sign(A,B)=ˆA,B, z′, a′, b′, r′ together
with SN and x0, x1, . . . , xn. The signature can be verified through Equation 5.1.
Verify Sign(A,B): gr′ = pkBc
′
a′ and Ar′ = z′c′b′ (5.1)
5.2.1.3 Spending
To spend a coin A,B, sign(A,B) the user sends it to a shop S with ID IDS . He
then proves a representation of A, i.e. that he is in possession of the coin, using his
blinding factor B. If the user wants to reveal an attribute Lj, he does not compute
rj but sends this attribute in the clear together with the value xj generated during
withdrawal. Note that revealing a larger number of attributes decreases the number
of equations ri that have to be computed on the user device, which however have to
be computed by the shop, but increases the amount of communicated data. After
the transaction and if the signature verifies, i.e. the coin is valid, the shop saves the
payment transcript consisting of A,B, sign(A,B), R, r1, . . . , rn and the time stamp ts.
This transaction is summarized in Table 5.4.
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Table 5.4. Brands’ with attributes spending protocol when revealing attribute Lj
U S
A,B,Sign(A,B)−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ A ?6= 1
r1 = −dL1 + x1 d←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− d = H0(A,B, IDS , ts)
...
rj−1 = −dLj−1 + xj−1
rj+1 = −dLj+1 + xj+1
...
rn = −dLn + xn
R = d/SN + x0
R,r1,...rj−1,rj+1,...,rn,Lj ,xj−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ rj = −dLj + xj
gr11 . . . g
rj








In order to deposit a coin, the shop submits the payment transcriptA,B, sign(A,B),
R, r1, . . . , rn and the time stamp ts to the bank. The bank verifies the validity of the
coin, i.e. whether it has a valid signature and whether a user had proven possession
of it. It then queries its database, where all deposited coins are recorded, to check
whether this coin had been deposited before. This double spending check does not
need to happen during the deposit phase. The bank could run it at specific time in-
tervals for all the coins in the database. If the deposited coin had not been recorded
in the database before, the bank will store A, d,R, r1, . . . , rn, ts, IDS in her database.
However, if the coin had been recorded, it means that it had been deposited before.
The bank then checks whether ts ?= ts′ and IDS ?= ID′S . If so, the shop is trying to
deposit the same coin twice. If not, the user spent the coin twice. Then the identity




1 . . . g
(rn−r′n)/(R−R′)
n ,
which was stored together with some identifying information of the user during the
registration process.
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5.2.2 ACL E-cash Allowing the Encoding and Selective Disclosure of At-
tributes
Anonymous Credentials Light [7] is a recent, very efficient “linkable” anonymous
credential system, which was constructed on top of Abe’s blind signature scheme [2].
In a linkable credential system multiple showings of a credential are linkable, thus a
user can show a credential only once, if he does not want transactions to be linkable.
This however, is suitable to be used as e-cash where credentials, i.e. electronic coins,
are used only once.
During the set up phase of ACL e-cash the bank chooses a group G of order q, a
generator g and a hash functionH : {0, 1}∗ → Zq. It also chooses z, h, h0, h1, h2, . . . hn
∈R G, where n is the maximum number of attributes that will be encoded into coins.
The secret key of the bank is skB ∈R Z∗q, whereas its public key is pkB = gskB and z
is the tag public key.
5.2.2.1 User Registration
When a user U with attributes L2, . . . , Ln, secret key skU = L1∈RZ∗q and public
key pkU = hL11 wants to open an account at the bank B he presents a valid identi-
fication document and commits to his attributes and public key, as shown in Table
5.5. He then proves knowledge of his secret key to the bank and that he formed
the commitment correctly. For each user the bank stores pkU ,C/pkU and a copy of
his identification document. Additionally to his secret key, attributes, public key
and commitment the user has to store the randomness R that corresponds to his
commitment C.
5.2.2.2 Withdrawal
To withdraw k coins from his account the user authenticates to the bank as it was
presented in Table 5.2. Then the user runs the ACL blind signature protocol (Table
5.6) k times, once for each coin.
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Table 5.5. ACL with attributes user registration protocol
B U






w0, . . . , wn ∈R Zq
C′ = hw00 . . . hwnn , pk′U = hw11
k = H(C/pkU ,C′/pk′U , pkU , pk′U , ts)
s0 = w0 + kR
s1 = w1 + kL1
C/pkU ,C′/pk′U ,pkU←−−−−−−−−−−−− ...
pkUkpk′U
?= hs11








of U together with C




′), which he stores together with rnd, τ and γ. For each withdrawn coin, the
bank stores z1 together with the user’s public key. This is later used in order to
identify a user in case he double-spends the coin.
5.2.2.3 Spending
The ACL e-cash spending protocol is presented in the upper part of Table 5.7. A
user spends a coin to a shop which validates its signature. If a user wants to reveal
an attribute Lj during the spending process, he will execute the revealing attribute
Lj protocol, which is presented in the lower part of Table 5.7. In this protocol a user
proves that the attributes encoded in his commitment are the same as are encoded in
the withdrawn coin, i.e. in value ζ1. The shop saves the payment transcript consisting
of coin, εp, µp, desc and ts.
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Table 5.6. ACL with attributes withdrawal protocol
B U
rnd ∈R Zq
z1 = Cgrnd, z2 = z/z1
u, c′, r′1, r
′
2 ∈R Zq










rnd,a,a′1,a′2−−−−−−−→ z1 = Cgrnd
γ ∈R Z∗q
ζ = zγ, ζ1 = zγ1 , ζ2 = ζ/ζ1
τ ∈R Zq, η = zτ
Check whether a, a′1, a′2 ∈ G
t1, t2, t3, t4, t5 ∈R Zq








ε = H(ζ, ζ1, α, α′1, α′2, η)
c = e− c′ e←−−−−−−−− e = ε− t2 − t4
r = u− cx c,r,c
′,r′1,r
′
2−−−−−−−−−→ ρ = r + t1
ω = c+ t2
ρ′1 = γr′1 + t3
ρ′2 = γr′2 + t5
ω′ = c′ + t4
5.2.2.4 Deposit
To deposit coin the shop sends the coin as well as εp, µp, desc and ts to the bank.
The bank verifies, whether the coin is valid and whether desc correctly encodes IDS
and ts.
In order to check, whether a coin has been spent before, which can be done at a
later point in time, the bank checks, whether coin already exists in its database of
deposited coins. If so, it will check, whether desc ?= desc′. If they are equal it means
that shop deposited the same coin twice. If they are different the bank can compute
γ = (µ′p − µp)/(p − ′p) and z1 = ζ1/γ1 .
It can then identify the cheating user, by checking whom z1 has been given to during
the withdrawal protocol.
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Table 5.7. ACL with attributes spending protocol revealing the attribute Lj
U S
p = H(zτ , coin, desc) desc←−−−−−−−− desc = H(IDS , ts)
µp = τ − pγ εp,µp,coin−−−−−−−−−→ ζ
?6= 1
p
?= H(zµpζp , coin, desc)
ω + ω′
?= H(ζ, ζ1, gρyω, gρ′1ζω′1 , hρ′2ζω′2 , zµpζp)
rnd′ ∈R Zq
C′ = hLjγj grnd
′γ
r, r′, r0, . . . , rn ∈R Zq
ζ˜1 = hr00 . . . hrnn gr
C˜′ = hrjj gr
′
c = H(ζ1, ζ˜1,C′, C˜′, ts′)
s0 = r0 + cRγ
s1 = r1 + cL1γ
...
sn = rn + cLnγ
s = r + c rnd γ Lj ,ζ1,ζ˜1,C
′,C˜′−−−−−−−−−−→
s′ = r′ + c rnd′ γ s0,...,sn,s,s




?= hs00 . . . hsnn gs
C˜′C′c ?= hsjj gs
′
5.3 Implementation of E-cash with Attributes on a Black-
Berry Bold 9900
This section arose from collaborative work with Christian T. Zenger during his
master thesis, which was supervised by the author of this dissertation.
We will now describe important aspects of our NFC-smartphone implementation
of the described e-cash with attributes schemes. In our measurement setup the ter-
minal, which represents the vending machines, i.e. the bank, as well as the turnstiles,
i.e. shops, is composed of a personal computer and an OMNIKEY smart card reader
from HID Global that is connected to the computer via USB. The user’s payment
device is represented by a BlackBerry Bold 9900, featuring NFC-capabilities. The
85
BlackBerry Bold 9900 is programmed using the BlackBerry Java SDK API 7.1.02
provided by Research in Motion.
5.3.1 Near Field Communication (NFC) Framework
All aspects of NFC are specified in ISO/IEC standards. We use the card-emulation
mode provided by the BlackBerry API. In this mode the BlackBerry Bold emulates a
standard-conform smartcard. Building the payment system on standard appliances,
makes it conform to already installed payment infrastructure and hence facilitates
deployment. The underlying standard for communication between the smartphone
and the reader in card-emulation mode is ISO/IEC 14443-A. This standard describes
the communication signal interface of contactless smart cards, operating at 13.56 MHz
with a bandwidth of 106 kbit/s. Both the Java SDK API 7.1.0 of the BlackBerry
device, and the JRE 6 System Library of the terminal support this standard.
Data is exchanged between the terminal and the (emulated) smartcard using so-
called Application Protocol Data Units (APDUs). The reader initializes the commu-
nication by sending a command APDU to the smartcard. The smartcard executes
this command and replies with a response APDU. The communication procedure be-
tween a smartcard and a smartcard reader is specified in standard ISO/IEC 7816-4.
Note that the size of an APDU is limited to 256 bytes.
Several attacks on NFC enabled mobile phones have been demonstrated, yet most
of them target the use of passive tags [103, 73] while we make use of the card emulation
mode. The security of the card emulation mode greatly depends on its implementa-
tion, in our case the Blackberry Java API. In [47] the authors identified five threats
that are introduced by the NFC communication link. Eavesdropping can be consid-
ered little problematic in our setting, as intercepted data is of no use to an attacker.
This is because (1) no user information is sent, apart from user attributes, which are
2http://www.blackberry.com/developers/docs/7.1.0api/
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assumed not to reveal private information about users and (2) if an attacker would
know the representation of a user’s coin, he could still not use it to pay with it for a
trip, as the private key of the user is required during the spending phase. An attacker
could harm a user, by corrupting or modifying sent data, and hence not letting him
execute the payment. Preventing denial-of-service attacks is very hard and would
occur with other contactless communication links also.
A relay attack is imaginable, in which an attacker acts as a man-in-the-middle,
by having two NFC-enabled devices that constitute a communication link, bringing
one of them in close proximity to a turnstile and the other in close proximity to a
user device and then paying with the coins of the user for a trip, if he manages to
confirm the payment of coins on the user device. But, in the transportation domain
this setting is very hard to realize in practice, as the attacker would have to bring one
device in close proximity to the payment machine and another one in close proximity
to the user device, while additionally having to pass the turnstile. A user can prevent
this attack by deactivating the NFC functionality, which is a further benefit of relying
on an NFC smartphone rather than on contactless smart cards.
5.3.2 Cryptographic Framework
We base the schemes on elliptic curve cryptography, and deduce from [20] that a
160-bit elliptic curve presents sufficient security for a micro-payment system. Similar
to the previous chapter we chose the curve secp160r1 from [82]. On the terminal side
we use the Bouncy Castle Crypto Library version 1.53. This library provides a general
elliptic curve framework supporting the use of many different curves. A dedicated
implementation of the elliptic curve functionality for the terminal’s hardware could
lead to a better performance of the execution of the payment schemes and is realistic
in the transportation setting. However, our investigations focus on the execution of
3http://www.bouncycastle.org/
87
the protocols on the user device and the communication of the protocols, which is
why we chose to use a standard library for the terminal side’s implementation.
The representation of finite field elements differs in the CryptoInteger class on the
BlackBerry and the BigInteger class that the Bouncy Castle library on the terminal is
based on. While BigInteger is a signed variable CryptoInteger is unsigned, which has
to be regarded during the conversion between those two types. The data is sent as
byte arrays over the NFC communication link, where an element in Zp is represented
as an array of 20 bytes. Since the size of the byte-array representation of the integer
values can be shorter than the designated 20 bytes, we pad with leading 0x00 when
receiving an element.
The BlackBerry API 7.1.0. supports the chosen curve secp160r1, i.e. an imple-
mentation of the ECDH key agreement based on this curve is provided by the API.
Yet, the BlackBerry API does not implement all functionality necessary for the im-
plementation of the proposed e-cash schemes, and hence had to be extended. Point
addition and doubling were implemented in Java making use of the modular arith-
metic functionality provided in the BlackBerry API. The implementation method
to execute the scalar multiplication efficiently is described in detail in the follow-
ing. Note, the implementation is customized for curve secp160r1, but could easily be
adapted to all other curves supported by BlackBerry API since version 3.6.0, which
range from 160 to 571-bit curves.
5.3.2.1 Efficient Execution of EC Scalar Multiplication Using the ECDH
Key Agreement
An implementation of the scalar multiplication Qk = [k]P in Java, making use of
the modular arithmetic functionality provided in the BlackBerry API, leads to an ex-
ecution time for the scalar multiplication of about 141 ms. Fortunately, the API con-
tains an ECDHKeyAgreement class, which offers the method generateSharedSecret.
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This method, which computes the scalar multiplication of an input point P = (xP , yP )
with an input scalar k, executes in 1 ms, but returns only the x-coordinate xQk of
the resulting point Qk. In the protocols of the considered payment schemes multiple
scalar multiplications and point additions have to be executed. Hence, knowledge of
the y-coordinate yQk of the resulting point is essential for further computations.
This drawback can be overcome. Starting from the short Weierstrass equation
y2 = x3 + ax + b, over which the chosen elliptic curve is defined, the absolute value
of yQk can be computed as |yQk | =
√
x3Qk + axQk + b mod p. Algorithm 3.36 in [69]
describes how to efficiently compute the square root in Zp, if p ≡ 3 mod 4, which
holds for the chosen curve. This results in two options for the resulting point Qk,
namely
Q+k = (xQk ,+|yQk |) and Q−k = (xQk ,−|yQk |).
To choose the correct option Q+k or Q−k for the resulting point Qk we use the
coherence Qk+1 = [k + 1]P = Qk + P . We executed the generateSharedSecret
function on (k + 1) and P to compute Qk+1. We further pick the positive result
Q+k = (xQk ,+|yQk |) and compute the x-coordinate of Q+k+1 as Q+k + P , using the






− xP − xQk mod p. (5.2)
We then check whether this result is equal to the x-coordinate of Qk+1 returned when
executing the generateSharedSecret function on (k + 1) and P . While this algo-
rithm, which is summarized as Algorithm 4.1, executes the generateSharedSecret
method twice and computes a square root in the prime field Zp, it still achieves a
major speed-up in execution time, when compared to the Java implementation based
on the arithmetic functionality that is provided in the BlackBerry API, i.e. yields an
execution time of around 4 ms.
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Algorithm 5: Recovering the y-coordinate, when using the ECDHKeyAgreement
class of the BlackBerry API to execute a scalar multiplication
Input : input point P , input scalar k
Output: x- coordinate and y-coordinate of resulting point Q = [k]P = (xQ, yQ)
1 xQk ← generateSharedSecret(k, P )
2 xQk+1 ← generateSharedSecret(k + 1, P )
3 |yQk | =
√






− xP − xQk mod p
5 if (xQk+1 == x+Qk+1) then
6 return (xQk ,+|yQk |)
7 end
8 else
9 return (xQk ,−|yQk |)
10 end
5.4 Performance of E-cash with Attributes on an NFC-Smart-
phone
The time critical phases of the e-cash schemes are the withdrawal and especially
the spending phase, as those have to be executed frequently, whereas the account
opening only happens once for each user (or for example once per user per year, if
new system keys are generated on a yearly basis, to increase security). We thus limit
the discussion of our results to the time critical withdrawal and spending phase.
The results for the execution of the withdrawal phase for all schemes are presented
in Table 5.8 whereas results for the spending of all schemes are presented in Table
5.9. We present four cases: i) Brands’ e-cash scheme, when not allowing the encoding
of attributes, ii) Abe’s scheme, which does not allow the encoding of attributes, iii)
Brands’ scheme when allowing the encoding of two attributes and iv) ACL when
allowing the encoding of two attributes. The spending results present timings for the
case of revealing both encoded attributes. Note that the private key of the user is not
counted as an attribute, i.e. a user encodes two attributes L2 and L3 additionally to
his private key L1. Of course, our implementation could support a bigger number of
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Table 5.8. Execution times of withdrawal per coin for i) Brands without attributes,
ii) Abe, which does not support the encoding of attributes, iii) Brands encoding two
attributes and iv) ACL encoding two attributes.
Scheme Terminal Communication Smartphone Total
Brands (without attributes) 66.1 ms 45.1 ms 123.8 ms 235 ms
Abe 93.6 ms 69.6 ms 137.5 ms 301 ms
Brands (with attributes) 73.2 ms 44.1 ms 128.7 ms 246 ms
ACL (with attributes) 93.6 ms 69.9 ms 137.5 ms 301 ms
Table 5.9. Execution times of spending per coin for i) Brands without attributes,
ii) Abe, which does not support the encoding of attributes, iii) Brands encoding two
attributes and revealing both and iv) ACL encoding two attributes and revealing
both of them.
Scheme Terminal Communication Smartphone Total
Brands (without attributes) 58.8 ms 96.8 ms 1.4 ms 157 ms
Abe 79.3 ms 81.0 ms 10.7 ms 171 ms
Brands (with attributes) 87.3 ms 114.8 ms 2.0 ms 204 ms
ACL (with attributes) 151.2 ms 221.4 ms 11.4 ms 384 ms
attributes if the transportation system required that, but keep in mind that there is
a trade-off between the number of attributes and the spending time.
Figures 5.1 and 5.2 illustrate those results, where the execution times of the dif-
ferent protocols have been summarized to Terminal: all computation executed on
the terminal side, Communication: execution time of the entire communication, and
Smartphone: all computation executed on the BlackBerry smartphone. In our im-
plementation all steps are executed serially, i.e. while waiting for the terminal the
execution on the smartphone is suspended. This resembles the execution on a stan-
dard smart card. Due to the extended capabilities of the smartphone, computations
on the smartphone and the terminal could be parallelized, which would lower the total
execution time of the presented protocols. For example in the withdrawal protocol
of ACL the bank could send the number rnd to the user right after generating it.
Then, while the bank computes a, a′1 and a′2 the user could at the same time compute
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z1, ζ, ζ1 and ζ2. Thus, what is summarized as the total time is an upper limit of the





















Figure 5.1. Illustration of the execution times of withdrawal per coin for i) Brands
without attributes, ii) Abe, which does not support the encoding of attributes, iii)
Brands encoding two attributes and iv) ACL encoding two attributes.
An advantage of the ACL scheme is that for the revealing attributes process
(second part of Table 5.7) the values C′, ζ˜1, C˜′ can be precomputed, which has been
realized for the implementation at hand. The computation time for those precom-
puted values is 39 ms and is not included in the presented results. By doing so the
total execution time for spending a coin of all schemes does not exceed 400 ms, which
is close to the acceptance threshold for spendings in the transportation domain, which
is 300 ms [81]. The results show that it is feasible to spend a coin meeting the extreme
time constraints of the transportation setting. Spending several coins serially exceeds
those time constraints. Yet, the execution time could further be reduced by batching
the executions that are required for spending several coins.
While the terminal side is represented by a powerful computer, in our experimental
set-up the execution of a scalar multiplication on the terminal takes longer than on
the BlackBerry device; on the BlackBerry an execution of the point multiplication
























Figure 5.2. Illustration of the execution times of spending per coin for i) Brands
without attributes, ii) Abe, which does not support the encoding of attributes, iii)
Brands encoding two attributes and revealing both and iv) ACL encoding two at-
tributes and revealing both of them.
we focus on the execution time on the payment device and on the communication
overhead. The implementation results could be improved when not relying on a
Java implementation for the terminal side, which is a realistic scenario, since the
transportation authority has full control over vending machines and turnstiles.
Surprisingly, a limiting factor for the execution of the different protocols is the
card emulation mode supported by the BlackBerry device. The communication band-
width is limited to 106 kbits/s, while the maximum bandwidth supported by the NFC
standard is 424 kbits/s. An additional deceleration limits the practical bandwidth
on the application layer to 62.5 kbit/s. Since the communication plays an integral
part in the execution of the spending protocol, a faster communication could signifi-
cantly improve the execution timings. Moreover, the length of an APDU is limited to
256 bytes, which is why for some protocol steps data had to be split up into multiple
APDUs. Hence, the overall execution time could be improved when allowing longer
APDUs.
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Table 5.10. Coin size (per coin data stored on user device) for the cases i) Brands
without attributes, ii) Abe, which does not support the encoding of attributes, iii)
Brands encoding two attributes and iv) ACL encoding two attributes.
Scheme Coin Elements Coin Sizein bytes
Brands (without attributes) A,B, z′, a′, b′, r′, s, x1, x2 289
Abe ζ, ζ1, ρ, ω, ρ′1, ρ′2, ω′, τ, γ 229
Brands (with attributes) A,B, z′, a′, b′, r′, s, x0, x1, x2, x3 331
ACL (with attributes) ζ, ζ1, ρ, ω, ρ′1, ρ′2, ω′, τ, γ, rnd, rnd′, C ′, ζ˜1, C˜ ′ 394
A further observation of Brands’ with attributes spending protocol is that the
number of equations that have to be computed on the user device decreases with the
number of attributes that are revealed. Yet, at the same time the communicated data
increases. For our implementation the increase in time for the communicated data
dominates the decrease in processing time. This could be different for other platforms,
where the communication plays a less important role in the overall execution time of
the protocol.
Table 5.10 shows the coin size for each of the schemes, i.e. the data that needs to
be stored on the user device for each coin. Since for the ACL scheme C′, ζ˜1, C˜′ have
been precomputed, they need to be stored together with rnd′ on the device as part
of the coin. If storage space would be more critical in comparison to the execution
time, those values could be computed on-the-fly when spending a coin, which would
lead to the same storage amount for a coin as in Abe’s scheme, but longer execution
times.
In the following we estimate the database requirements for our e-cash based trans-
portation payment system. We base our estimations on the Massachusetts Bay Trans-
portation Authority (MBTA) system. The MBTA reports an average ridership of
1.28 million trips per day for February 2013 [67].
In the case of Brands’ e-cash with attributes scheme the bank needs to store the
values A, d, (R, r1, . . . , rn) for each coin in the database, in order to detect double-
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spending at a later point in time. Assuming the encoding of two attributes, this
results in 146 bytes per coin and an average of 178 MB per day that need to be stored
in the database.
In case of ACL the bank has to have two databases. One stores the values z1
together with the public key pkU of a user for each withdrawn coin and another one
that stores ζ1, desc, εp and µp for each spent coin. This results in 186 bytes per coin
and an average of 227 MB that need to be stored daily in the database assuming an
average of 1.28 million trips per day.
Managing large databases does not primarily depend on the number of data
records and the size of the related storage. It greatly depends on the complexity
of the search-and-join algorithm. In our case the database just has to operate with
primary-key related search requests – in the case of Brands’ scheme it is the 21 byte
value A. Executing the search-and-join algorithm to add a set of 1.28 million data
records to a database that has 1 billion entries should be executable within a couple
of minutes.
5.5 Implementation of E-cash with Attributes on a MULTOS
Smartcard
This section arose from collaborative work with Felix Riek, during his master
thesis, which was supervised by the author of this dissertation.
We demonstrated that both schemes execute efficiently on the chosen NFC-smart-
phone, achieving execution times that suffice to be applied in the public transportation
domain. It is however highly desirable to execute payment applications on secure
hardware, such as the SIM card or the embedded secure element of a smartphone,
instead of a smartphone’s main processor. These devices are usually equipped with
smartcard-like chips. We thus further evaluate the performance of the considered
schemes on an off-the-shelf smartcard.
95
MULTOS International Pte Ltd. is one of the leading providers of technology and
solutions for the smartcard industry [74]. The consortium provides MULTOS mod-
ules, or chips to card manufacturers. Their application ranges from banking, over
transit payments to government ID. The hardware of MULTOS cards may differ for
different types of MULTOS cards, depending on the chip manufacturer, but it has to
be ensured that it supports a specified MULTOS operating system. Communication
with the card and provision of the virtual machine, which handles code execution on
the card as well as memory management and loading and deletion of applications,
are provided by the MULTOS operating system [66]. It is claimed by the MULTOS
consortium that they provide “the world’s most secure multi-application smartcard
operating system” [74]. A multi-application smartcard has many benefits, as it can
host multiple applications in a single device. It can thus combine several payment
and authentication services, such as transit payments, credit card payments and gov-
ernment ID in a single card. Besides security the focus lies on an open access, which
is why those cards were chosen for this work. In particular we use UbiVelox UBM 21-
Z48 cards as the API of these MULTOS smartcards support a variety of cryptographic
primitives, in particular elliptic curve cryptography, allowing the implementation of
advanced cryptographic protocols on them.
To allow the secure execution of multiple applications on the card, the operating
system provides an application separating firewall, ensuring that applications on the
card cannot interfere with each other. This firewall provides each application with
memory area for code, data and session data. The firewall ensures that the code
memory space cannot be read or written by another application. Application data,
which has to persist in memory over multiple executions of the application is stored
in data memory. Code and data are stored in EEPROM of the chip. Session data,
which is only needed within an execution of a specific application, is held in the
much faster RAM on the card. Information is exchanged between reader and card
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using Application Protocol Data Units (APDU). A reader sends a command APDU
to which the card answers with a corresponding APDU response. A command APDU
has a 4 byte header. This header encodes a class byte CLS, which selects the class
within an instruction, an instruction byte INS, which selects the instruction within
a class and two parameter bytes P1 and P2, which specify parameters within the
instruction. It further has an optional body consisting of a byte Lc, which specifies
the length of the command data that follows, the command data itself and a byte Le,
which indicates the expected length of the cards response.
We used a UBM21-Z48 developer card manufactured by UbiVelox for our analysis.
This card, which supports MULTOS version 4.2.1, contains an ST23ZL48 chip from
STMicroelectronics4. The ST23ZL48 chip has a 8/16-bit ST23 CPU core, 300 kB
of ROM, 6 kB of RAM, and 48 kB of EEPROM. The CPU can be operated at fre-
quencies of up to 27 MHz. It further has an AIS-31 class P2 compliant true random
number generator and the enhanced NESCRYPT crypto-processor [97]. The copro-
cessor provides high-performance native support for GF(p) and GF(2n) arithmetic
and includes dedicated instructions to accelerate execution of the SHA-1 and SHA-2
family of hash functions. It thus allows high-performance implementations of public-
key cryptosystems [96]. We chose this card due to its elliptic curve cryptography
(ECC) support, on which we base the implemented e-cash schemes.
MULTOS requires that the function getRandomNumber is supported by its ap-
proved platforms but leaves its implementation to the card manufacturer. While the
NESCRYPT coprocessor offers true random number generation, we do not know,
whether this is used to generate random numbers directly, or whether it is used as
seed for a pseudo random number generator (PRNG). We checked the statistical
properties of the generated random numbers on the card using the National Institute
4http://www.multos.com/products/approved_platforms/
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of Standards and Technology’s test suite [85]. We generated a 126 MB random num-
ber sequence and ran all tests on it. Based on these tests, we found no violations
against true random behavior irrespective of the test. We conclude that the statistical
properties of the generated random numbers are good.
5.5.1 Framework Implementation
In our implementation the terminal, which is represented by an HP ProBook
650G1 notebook with an Intel i5-4200M processor having 8 GB RAM and running
Windows 7 (64 Bit), represents the bank as well as the shop. Communication is exe-
cuted with the notebook’s integrated Alcor Micro Smart Card Reader. The terminal
implementation is based on Java and was developed using the Eclipse Luna Service
Release 1. While a C implementation would lead to faster execution times, our main
focus is on evaluating the execution time of the computation on the smartcard side.
Terminals could easily be equipped with stronger or dedicated hardware, greatly
reducing the execution time on the terminal. Java provides the javax.smartcardio
package allowing a comfortable implementation of communication with smartcards
via APDUs. This package provides an API to set up connection with the smartcard
reader as well as sending APDUs to and receiving from a smartcard. For the im-
plementation of cryptographic functionality we relied on the Bouncy Castle library
version 1.5.1. This library provides a great variety of cryptographic functionality,
including the implementation of elliptic curve cryptography and hash generation. We
further relied on the MySQL 5.5 database management system to log the execution
times of each protocol.
We developed code for the smartcard using the MULTOS SmartDeck application
development system for MULTOS cards and loaded the application to the card using
MULTOS Utility (MUtil). SmartDeck contains the required compiler, a generator to
generate Application Load Units (ALUs) and a debugger for code development. A
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developer key is required to load the application to the card. Code for the card can be
written directly in MULTOS Assembly Language (MAL) or in a higher level language
(C or Java) which is then translated by the compiler. We choose C as programming
language, since the set up is easier than the one for Java and code can be written much
more efficiently than in MAL. While more efficient code could be written in MAEL
we anticipate that the speed-up would be limited as we mostly relied on functionality
provided by the card’s API.
Our implementation is based on the Brainpool elliptic curves at various security
levels. Those curves, which were proposed by the Brainpool consortium, are for ex-
ample implemented in the German identity card and have recently been standardized
for use in TLS [65]. While we measured execution times for elliptic curves of four se-
curity levels, namely brainpoolP160r1 (reaching a security level comparable to 80-bit
symmetric security), brainpoolP192r1 (reaching a security level comparable to 96-bit
symmetric security), brainpoolP224r1 (reaching a security level comparable to 112-
bit symmetric security), and brainpoolP256r1 (reaching a security level comparable
to 128-bit symmetric security), we only present implementation results for brain-
poolP160r1 and brainpoolP256r1, to make our results comparable to the previous
results of this and the preceding chapter.
5.6 Performance of E-cash with Attributes on a MULTOS
Smartcard
We first present the execution times of both schemes on the chosen platform and
then give estimates for the number of coins that could be stored in the chosen smart-
card. Our analysis targets the evaluation of the execution times of the withdrawal
and spending protocols. While registration is executed only once, withdrawal and
spending are executed repeatedly over a period of time, and thus greatly determine
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Table 5.11. Execution times of the withdrawal protocols of Brands’ untraceable
offline cash scheme [21] and Anonymous Credentials Light (ACL) [7] for the case of
encoding two attributes into a coin based on the brainpoolP160r1 (160-bit) and the
brainpoolP256r1 (256-bit) elliptic curves.
Scheme Terminal Communication Card Total
Brands (160-bit) 118 ms 194 ms 2, 114 ms 2, 426 ms
ACL (160-bit) 158 ms 360 ms 2, 430 ms 2, 948 ms
Brands (256-bit) 179 ms 279 ms 2, 996 ms 3, 454 ms
ACL (256-bit) 204 ms 544 ms 3, 438 ms 4, 186 ms
user acceptance. We obtained the execution times by executing the protocols 100
times and averaging the results.
The execution times for the withdrawal protocol for Brands and ACL encoding
two attributes into coins are presented in Table 5.11. We present the times for com-
putations on the card, computations on the terminal, the communication overhead,
and the total execution time. Results are presented at two security levels, namely at























Figure 5.3. Execution times of Brands’ and ACL withdrawal protocols at the 80-
bit and 128-bit security levels, encoding two attributes (illustration of the results
presented in Table 5.11).
As mentioned above an 80-bit security level should be sufficient for the deployment
of a low-value payment scheme, and thus the withdrawal of a coin can be executed in
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under 2.5 seconds and 3 seconds respectively. While for both protocols the computa-
tion on the card clearly presents the bottleneck in the scheme, we observe a noticeable
difference between the execution times of the two withdrawal protocols. ACL requires
the communication of a greater number of elements as well as the more computation
of arithmetic in G on the card. Please note however, that ACL has a full prove of
security, which comes at the expense of only slightly less efficiency. We would further
like to emphasize that the withdrawal process is not time critical and could be exe-
cuted at home. A user could be provided with a desktop banking application, which
would allow him to charge his payment device using his personal smartcard reader.
He could start the charging process and could leave the card inserted in the reader
until the withdrawal process is completed. Even if this takes multiple minutes this
could be acceptable for users.
The timings for spending a coin, not revealing an attribute, are presented in Ta-
ble 5.12. Note that in our study we present timings of the spending protocols without
revealing attributes only. In that case 9 exponentiations and 3 comparisons in G have
to be executed for Brands’ spending protocol on the terminal, while only 8 exponen-
tiations in G and 3 comparisons in Zq have to be executed on the terminal for the
ACL scheme, leading to lower computation times on the terminal. Additionally, in
Brands’ spending protocol the communication is split in two parts, and the com-
municated data is 5 elements in G and 5 elements in Zq, while ACL requires only
the communication of 2 elements in G and 7 elements in Zq, thus leading to lower
communication times for ACL. For the 256-bit curve based Brands’ spending proto-
col the communicated data needs to be split into a greater number of APDUs thus
leading to proportionally higher communication times. Overall, when not revealing
an attribute both spending protocols can be executed within 800 ms when relying on
a 80-bit security level.
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Table 5.12. Execution times of the spending protocols of Brands’ untraceable of-
fline cash scheme [21] and Anonymous Credentials Light (ACL) [7] based on brain-
poolP160r1 (160-bit) and brainpoolP256r1 (256-bit) elliptic curves for the case that
two attributes are encoded in a coin but no attribute is revealed.
Scheme Terminal Communication Card Total
Brands (160-bit) 110 ms 433 ms 259 ms 769 ms
ACL (160-bit) 76 ms 310 ms 407 ms 793 ms
Brands (256-bit) 257 ms 660 ms 297 ms 1, 063 ms
ACL (256-bit) 92 ms 466 ms 510 ms 1, 068 ms
If an attribute was revealed during the spending, we would save on one modular
multiplication and addition on the card side for Brands’ protocol, which would then
have to be executed on the terminal side, but would have to send one more element
in Zq. This would only slightly increase the communication time. By measurements
we figured out that the communication of one byte requires 1.18 ms plus an initial
26 ms for the initialization of an APDU. The communication would thus increase by
less then 50 ms. If an attribute was revealed during the spending of ACL’s scheme,
7 random numbers in Zq would have to be generated, 9 exponentiations in G, 14
modular multiplications and 6 modular additions in Zq, as well as one hash function
would have to be computed. Additionally, 3 elements in G and 7 elements in Zq
would have to be sent to the terminal, resulting in an increase in communication time
of about 330 ms, when relying on the 160-bit elliptic curve. Thus when revealing
an attribute the spending of the ACL scheme would be outperformed by Brands’
spending protocol.
Those results demonstrate that keeping the number of encoded attributes to a
minimum is required to reach an acceptable execution time. However, we would like
to emphasize that in the 160-bit implementation an attribute can encode 160 bits of
data. One could hence encode multiple attribute values into one coin attribute. For





















Figure 5.4. Execution times of Brands’ and ACL spending protocols at the 80-
bit and 128-bit security levels, encoding two attributes but revealing no attribute
(illustration of the results presented in Table 5.12).
coin attribute. This would greatly limit the number of attributes that would have to
be encoded into a coin.
While the EEPROM size of the chip integrated in the card is given as 48 kB, we
found out that only 44.7 kB are available for writing on the used card. The implemen-
tation of Brands’ protocol requires 7 kB of code space, leaving 37.7 kB available for
storing electronic coins. A coin in Brands’ protocol, encoding two attributes, requires
storing 5 elements in G and 6 elements in Zq. For the 160-bit implementation this
adds up to 320 bytes per coin, while 512 bytes are required for storing a coin based
on the 256-bit implementation. Next to other data, such as the keying material and
so on, this allows to store around 110 of Brands’ coins on the card, when relying on
a 160-bit implementation and 65 when relying on the 256-bit implementation, if no
other application would be implemented.
ACL requires 8.4 kB of code space, thus leaving 36.3 kB available for storing
electronic coins. Storing coin data in ACL requires storing 2 elements in G and 8
elements in Zq. For the 160-bit implementation this adds up to 240 bytes that have
to be stored on the card per coin, while 384 bytes have to be stored per coin using
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the ACL scheme based on a 256-bit implementation. Thus around 150 of ACL coins
can be stored on the card, when relying on the 160-bit key size, while only 90 coins
can be stored when relying on the 256-bit key size, if the card is solely used for this
payment application.
5.7 Discussion
Brands’ [21] and ACL [7] e-cash schemes, allowing the encoding of attributes
are suitable payment schemes for use in public transport, due to their efficiency
during the spending phase. While the ACL scheme is a little less efficient than
Brands’ with attributes, it is the only practical e-cash with attributes that comes
with a formal proof of security. This chapter presented a full implementation of
Brands’ with and without attributes, Abe’s and ACL on a BlackBerry Bold 9900.
We proposed a method that allows the use of the ECDHKeyAgreement class of the
BlackBerry API to compute the result of a scalar multiplication on an elliptic curve, by
recovering the y-coordinate of the resulting point, which led to transaction times that
meet real-world requirements of transportation payment systems for all considered
schemes. Surprisingly, a limiting factor of the transaction is the NFC communication
bandwidth.
We further presented an implementation of both e-cash schemes on an off-the-
shelf MULTOS smartcard. Due to their support of elliptic curve cryptography and
open API access, we used the UBM21-Z48 developer cards from UbiVelox for our
investigations. We implemented both schemes in a way that the encoding of two
attributes was allowed, while we did not reveal them during spending. We however
give estimates of the execution times, when allowing revealing an attribute. Our
results are promising. When relying on an implementation, of which the security is
comparable to 80-bit symmetric security, which we consider sufficient for low-value
payment schemes, a spending can be executed within 800 ms for both schemes, while
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the cards would allow storing 110 and 150 coins respectively for both schemes. We
further presented execution times at a high security level, namely comparable to
128-bit symmetric security, and show that the performance of our implementation is
acceptable for high-security applications.
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CHAPTER 6
LIGHTWEIGHT ANONYMOUS NFC-PAYMENTS FOR
E-MOBILITY
This chapter presents results that arose from collaborative work with Olga Ko-
robova, Andy Rupp and Sven Scha¨ge. Results that were not developed by the author
of this dissertation will be clearly marked in the respective sections.
The use of electric mobiles has many benefits in particular in densely populated
areas. Electric cars avoid local emissions, decrease noise pollution, allow transport
to partially be based on renewable energies, and can achieve the independence of
transport from petroleum, thus ensuring the long-term availability of transport.
While this makes e-mobility sound like a promising solution, especially in densely
populated areas, there are many difficulties yet to be solved. An important one is
the provision of a charging infrastructure for electric mobiles and a payment system
to pay for charged energy. Relying on electronic payments seems unavoidable due to
the great distribution of charging stations and the associated high maintenance cost
of cash payments. Yet, especially in the e-mobility domain, revealing a user’s identity
during a payment greatly infringes his location privacy, as the location of a user’s car
is closely connected to the location of the user himself [77]. It was recently found out
that privacy is a key factor for user acceptance of e-mobility [34].
In this chapter we analyze the use of lightweight e-cash schemes in the e-mobility
domain. A scheme, well-known for its efficiency during the spending phase, which has
also been analyzed for its application in the public transport domain in the preceding
chapters, is Brands’ untraceable offline cash scheme [21]. However, a major drawback
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of this efficient electronic cash scheme is the difficulty of realizing change in a privacy-
preserving way.
Chapter 4 presented a performance analysis of the privacy-preserving pre-payments
with refunds scheme (P4R) [87] to be used in the public transport domain based on
a practical implementation. Rather then relying on a user being able to receive elec-
tronic coins as change, this scheme realizes a privacy-preserving refund system. In
P4R a user pays using an electronic coin, and if the coin value exceeds the value of his
fare, the user receives a refund in a privacy-preserving way, which he can redeem at
the bank at a later point in time. To increase privacy and limit the required storage
space, a user accumulates several refunds in a single refund token.
We now analyze, how P4R can be used to solve the issue of privacy in the domain
of e-mobility payments. Using the same payment scheme for public transportation
payments and payments in the e-mobility domain allows using the same payment
service for both types of transport, which presents a key factor in achieving customer
convenience. We first describe a charging infrastructure in the e-mobility domain and
identify which security and privacy objectives should be satisfied in this setting. We
then present our scheme, which extends P4R to allow the encoding of user attributes
into electronic coins. A peculiarity of payments in the e-mobility domain is the fact
that a charging process takes at least half an hour in which a user should not be forced
to stay at his car. It must however be ensured that the user cannot leave the charging
station without paying for the received charge and that an attacker cannot interfere
with the charging process during the user’s absence. We show, how this is solved by
our system. We further analyze our proposed scheme, discussing its performance and
informally describing which security and privacy objectives can be met.
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6.1 Related Work
The first work on privacy-preserving payments in the e-mobility domain has been
presented by Liu et al. in [64]. Our approach is different in that we try to limit the
payment device’s computation required during the spending to a minimum. This
is beneficial in scenarios, where even extremely constrained payment tokens such as
smartcards are supported. We emphasize that, even if a user pays using her mobile
phone, a payment application should be executed on a trusted device such as the
smartphone’s secure element, which usually has the same computational capabilities
as a smartcard’s processor. We build on the privacy-preserving pre-payments with re-
funds scheme proposed by Rupp et al. for use in public transportation systems in [86].
While it is extremely desirable to allow for the same payment scheme to be applica-
ble in several scenarios, there are distinct differences between public transportation
payment systems and payments in the e-mobility domain, which we will point out
in this chapter. A very different approach to reaching privacy in the e-mobility do-
main has been studied in [36]. In their billing payment scheme the authors preserve
users’ location privacy by obscuring the identity of a charging station during a billing
process instead of obscuring a user’s identity.
6.2 E-mobility Payment Systems
In Figure 6.1 we present an overview of a charging infrastructure for e-mobility.
We differentiate between payment service providers, who process and check the cor-
rectness of payments, and electricity providers, who provide a charging station infras-
tructure, i.e. are in possession of charging stations and provide electric energy. By
allowing for independence of electricity providers and payment service providers, a
widespread charging infrastructure can be provided to e-mobility users, not limiting









Figure 6.1. Overview of a charging infrastructure for e-mobility. We differentiate be-
tween payment service providers, who process and check the correctness of payments,
and electricity providers, who provide a charging station infrastructure, i.e. are in
possession of charging stations and provide electric energy.
A payment service provider can either offer some kind of billing payment system,
where a user is billed after having received electric energy from a charging station,
or a prepaid system, where a user receives payment tokens of specific values that he
can later use in order to pay for electric energy at a charging station. In this work,
we concentrate on the prepaid system, as this can be constructed based on e-cash
schemes, protecting a user’s privacy by design.
In order to be able to pay at a charging station, a user registers with a pay-
ment service provider, deposits money, and receives a bundle of payment tokens in
exchange, which he stores in his electronic wallet. Tokens of several values can be
offered, such that at a charging station the user can choose to pay with a suitable
payment token depending on the amount of charge he wants to receive. The user
would pay for those tokens using his credit card, or would set up a service that would
directly withdraw the money from his bank account.
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We allow the encoding and selective disclosure of user attributes into payment
tokens. As described in the previous chapter, this feature supports participation
in discount programs and further supports “privacy-preserving” data-mining. An
important benefit of attributes that can be selectively disclosed is that a user can
decide during the spending, if he wishes to disclose an attribute or not.
At a charging station the user prepays for the electric energy he will receive using
one of his payment tokens. The charging station can monitor the current price for
electricity and the car can monitor the amount of required charge, such that the user
can choose a suitably valued payment token. The user inserts a charging cable into
the plugs at the charging station and his car respectively, and starts the charging
process. The charging station will lock its screen, such that the user can leave the
scene during the charging process. During this time his charging cable is locked to
the car and the charging station such that nobody can steal it.
The charging station will charge the car until the price of the charge reaches the
value of the payment token, until the user cancels the charging process, or until the
car is fully charged. In case the token’s value is reached, the charging station stops
charging, but does not release the charging cable. Only if the user authenticates
himself with the same payment token again, he will be able to finalize the charging
process, which includes releasing the charging cable. In case the charging process is
stopped before the received energy reaches the value of the payment token, he receives
a refund based on his overpayment.
6.3 Security and Privacy Objectives
The focus of this chapter lies on presenting practical performance results of a
privacy-preserving payment scheme suitable for the e-mobility domain, which is based
on P4R but additionally supports the encoding of user attributes into payment tokens.
We only informally discuss the desired security and privacy objectives. A formal
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model and full security proof is left as future work. Informally speaking, an e-mobility
payment scheme should satisfy the following security and privacy objectives:
I. A user must not lose money. Summarizing all charging processes of a user,
she should not pay more than the cost for the overall received electric energy,
i.e. the overall received electric energy ∑ vEEi and all received refunds ∑ vRFi ,
minus the money a user deposited for all used payment tokens ∑ vPTi should
be greater or equal to zero: ∑ vEEi +∑ vRFi −∑ vPTi ≥ 0.
II. A user’s location privacy must be preserved, i.e. the process of executing pay-
ments or collecting refunds must not reveal her identity.





vRFj ≥ 0, i.e. the sum of all money received from users in
exchange for payment tokens ∑ vPTj , minus the money deposited to electricity
providers’ bank accounts ∑ vDPj , minus all refunds paid to users ∑ vRFj must
not be smaller than zero.
IV. An electricity provider must not lose money, i.e. the value for electric charge
that he provided to users ∑ vEEk should not be greater than the overall money
that was credited to his bank account ∑ vDPk : ∑ vDPk −∑ vEEk ≥ 0
6.4 Payment Scheme Description
In contrast to the public transport domain where the transportation authority
controls vending machines, which give out payment tokens and redeem refunds, and
turnstiles, which accept payments and give out refunds, in the e-mobility domain
we differentiate between payment service providers (P) and electricity providers (E).
Charging stations belong to an electricity provider, whereas payments are controlled
by a payment service provider. In order to realize a modular system, which in specific
can function across country borders, we do not assume trust between those entities.
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However, we do assume that an electricity provider has a constant communication
link to a payment service provider’s server, which is equipped with the secret BLS
signature key, and can be queried to add a refund to a refund token. We do not
assume that the payment service provider’s database can be queried in real-time to
check whether a coin has been spent before. This is because the payment service
provider’s coin database presents a bottleneck in the system. One can equip multiple
servers with keying material to check payments and add refunds, but there can only be
one database to store and check multiple occurrences of payment transcripts. Instead
a double-spending check is used to identify cheating users, which can be executed at
any point in time.
In [86] it is assumed that users (U) do not check, whether they received a correct
refund. This can be assumed for low refund values as they usually occur in public
transportation systems, it however does not hold for the e-mobility domain. In our
system a user receives a refund token, for which he can prove that it correctly encodes
the pzyment service provider’s private BLS signature key, i.e. that it is a valid refund
token. For each received refund he will check whether it was added correctly. This
check further ensures, that the refund token remains valid.
We rely on Schnorr’s signature scheme [92] to generate receipts rc. Given a gener-
ator g ∈ G, a private key sk ∈ Z∗q and a corresponding public key pk = gsk a signature
σ(msg) = (y, k) on a message msg is generated by choosing a random value r ∈ Zq,





) ?= k. (6.1)
6.4.1 System Setup
We base the scheme on an asymmetric bilinear pairing G1, G2 → GT , where G1
and G2 have order q. Generators g, g′, g0, . . . , gn ∈ G1 and h ∈ G2 are selected, where
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n is the number of attributes that will be encoded in a payment token, and a hash
function H : {0, 1}∗ → Z∗q is chosen.
The payment service provider’s secret payment token system key is skP∈RZq with
corresponding public key pkP = gskP . If payment tokens of different values are sup-
ported the payment service provider generates several secret and public key pairs,
one for each value of the tokens. He further sets up the refund token system with
a private BLS signature key skPBLS∈RZq and corresponding public BLS signature
key pkPBLS = h
skPBLS . He then generates a list in which he lists refund check values
RCi = hsk
2i
PBLS for i = 1 . . . blog2 vPTc, where vPT is the value of a payment token. Note
that no separate refund check value is required for i = 0 as this is equal to the public
BLS signature key RC0 = pkPBLS . If the unit is cents and vPT = $10, then the list has
9 entries.
If an electricity provider wants to use the payment service provider’s service,
he registers and receives IDE . He then generates a private and public key pair skE ∈
Zq, pkE = gskE and proves knowledge of his secret key to the payment service provider.
Table 6.1. List of refund check values
Refund value RCi
21 = 2 ¢ RC1 = hsk
2
PBLS









During registration a user generates a secret key skU∈RZq, computes a public key
pkU = gskU0 , and commits to the attributes L1, . . . , Ln in a commitment C. He proves
knowledge of his secret key and that he correctly encoded his attributes and secret
key into C to the payment service provider. We assume that the payment service
113
provider controls, whether a user is eligible to participate in a discount program, and
whether the user can participate in a privacy-preserving data-mining system and thus
checks, which attributes a user can include in his commitment. A user thus reveals
his attributes to the payment service provider, who can compute C on his own (using
a user’s public key). The payment service provider stores identifying information of
a user together with the user’s public key and commitment C in his user database.
A user stores his key pair, the commitment C and the value z he received from the
payment service provider. The registration process is shown in Table 6.2, where ts
denotes a time stamp.
Table 6.2. P4R for e-mobility user registration protocol.
P U
pkP ,pkPBLS ,RC0,...,RCm−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ skU , w0∈RZ∗q, pkU = gskU0
C = pkUgL11 gL22 . . . gLnn , If C 6= 1:
pk′U = gw00
k = H(C, pkU , pk′U , ts)
k = H(C, pkU , pk′U , ts)
C,pkU ,pk′U ,ts,L1,...,Ln,s0←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− s0 = w0 + k × skU
C ?= pkUgL11 gL22 . . . gLnn
pkkUpk′U
?= gs00
z = (Cg′)skP z−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ Store z
6.4.3 (Re-) Charge Electronic Wallet
To receive payment tokens a user authenticates to the payment service provider
and claims how many payment tokens he would like to receive by signing a message
containing the number NPT of payment tokens he would like to receive and a time
stamp ts (cf. upper part of Table 6.3).
For each token the user and the payment service provider engage in Brands’ with
attributes withdrawal protocol adapted to allowing two showings of a coin without
revealing the user’s identity. This is presented in the lower part of Table 6.3. Dur-
ing this process the user generates the serial number tag A of the coin and two
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Table 6.3. P4R for e-mobility (re-) charge electronic wallet protocol.
P U
NPT,ts,rc←−−−−−− rc = σskU (NPT, ts)
w∈RZq, a = gw, b = (Cg′)w a,b−−−−−−→ s∈RZ∗q, A = (Cg′)s, z′ = zs




1, . . . , x
′
n, u, v∈RZq




0 . . . g
x′n
n
a′ = augv, b′ = bsuAv
c←−−−−−− c′ = H(A,B,B′, z′, a′, b′)
c = c′/u
t = c× skP + w t−−−−−−→ gt ?= pkcPa, (Cg′)t ?= zcb
t′ = t× u+ v
Choose SN∈RZq
SNRT = gSN×skPBLS , T = gSN
SNRT,T−−−−−−→ e(SNRT, h) ?= e(T, pkPBLS)
RT = SNRT, R = 1, v = 0
blinding factors B and B′ and receives a signature Sign(A,B,B′) on those. Af-
ter execution of the protocol the user knows a representation of the payment token
A,B,B′, Sign(A,B, B′) = A,B,B′, z′, a′, b′, t′, which he stores together with the val-
ues s, x, x0, x1, . . . , xn, x′, x′0, x′1, . . . , x′n in his e-wallet.
Together with a bundle of payment tokens the user receives a refund token RT.
The payment service provider chooses a serial number for the refund token SN∈RZq,
computes SNRT together with a valid BLS signature on it and sends it to the user,
who checks the signature and stores the refund token together with T,R and v. The
payment service provider stores in his database that SNRT belongs to the user.
6.4.4 Start Charging
To start a charging process the user sends a payment token to a charging station,
and proves possession of it using the blinding factor B. The electricity provider
checks whether the received token is valid by computing c′ = H(A,B,B′, z′, a′, b′)
and verifying Sign(A,B,B′) through
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gt
′ ?= pkc′Pa′ and At
′ ?= z′c′b′. (6.2)
He then saves the payment transcript A,B,B′, Sign(A,B,B′), R, r0, . . . , rn, d. This
process is presented in Table 6.4 and was before described in [52].
Table 6.4. P4R for e-mobility start charging protocol
U E
A,B,B′,Sign(A,B,B′)−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ A ?6= 1
r0 = −d× skU + x0
r2 = −d× L2 + x2 d←−−−−−−−−−−−−− d = H(A,B,B′, IDE , ts)
...
rn = −d× Ln + xn
R = d/s+ x (R,r0,r2,...,rn)(L1,x1)−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ r1 = −d× L1 + x1
gr00 g
r1






To again authenticate with the same charging station the user sends the same
payment token, used to start the charging process, to the charging station and proves
possession of it this time using blinding factor B′. The electricity provider checks
whether the received token is the same as was presented during the start charging
process, and whether it is a valid token belonging to this user.
The user then presents his randomized refund token to the electricity provider, who
computes the refund value as the value of the payment token minus the value of the
energy that a user received vRF = vPT− vEE. The electricity provider signs RT′, A, vRF
and a time stamp and sends the payment transcript as well as the signature and the
blinded refund token to the payment service provider, who checks the validity of the
payment token and, if the signature verifies, adds vRF to the refund token and credits
vPT − vRF to the electricity provider’s bank account. The payment service provider
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further sends a receipt to the electricity provider stating that vPT− vRF was added to
his bank account (cf. Table 6.5).
The payment service provider saves the payment transcriptA,B,B′, Sign(A,B,B′),
R, r0, . . . , rn, ts and the receipt he received from the electricity provider. Due to giv-
ing out this receipt the electricity provider cannot deny that he asked the payment
service provider to add vRF to the refund token and credit vPT− vRF to the electricity
provider’s bank account.
The user checks whether the refund was added correctly. If the pairing equations
hold, and if RT′′i was a valid refund token, then RT′′i+1 is also a valid refund token
additionally encoding vRFi .
6.4.6 Redeem Refund
To redeem his collected refund a user again randomizes his refund token and
presents RT′, SNRT, v, R together with a receipt that she is trying to redeem her refund
token to the payment service provider, who checks whether this token belongs to the
user and whether the pairing equation in Table 6.6 is satisfied. If the check verifies
the payment service provider credits the refund value v to the user’s bank account,
and marks the refund token as redeemed in his database.
6.4.7 Double-Spending Detection
During this process the payment service provider checks, whether he had already
received a payment token with this particular serial number tag, i.e. whether a pay-
ment transcript with the same serial number tag A occurs in his database. If so he
will check whether the same value d is part of the payment transcript, which indicates
that the electricity provider deposited the same payment token twice. If not, the same
payment token has been used twice by a user. The payment service provider can then
reveal the cheating user’s identity by computing
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Table 6.5. P4R for e-mobility stop charging protocol
U E
A,B,B′,Sign(A,B,B′)−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ Check if the same A was pre-
sented during start charging.
r′0 = −d′ × skU + x′0
r′2 = −d′ × L2 + x′2 d
′←−−−−−−−−−−−− d′ = H(A,B,B′, IDE , ts′)
...
r′n = −d′ × Ln + x′n

















rnd,∈RZ∗q, RT′ = RTrnd
R = R× rnd RT′−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
E P
rc′ = σ′skE (RT
′, A, vRF, tˆs)
RT′,A,B,B′,Sign(A,B,B′)−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
ts,R,r0,...rn,d,vRF,tˆs,rc′−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ gr00 gr11 . . . grnn h−d ?= A−RB
Verify Sign(A,B,B′) and rc′
Credit vPT − vRF to Es account
rc′′ = σskP (vPT − vRF, IDE , ts)
vRF =
∑m
i=0 vRFi2i, RT′′0 = RT′
For (i = 0 to m)
If (vRFi 6= 0):









For i = 0 to m
If (vRFi 6= 0):
e(RT′′i+1, h)
?= e(RT′′i ,RCi)
RT = RT′′m, v = v + vRF
C = g(r0−r˜0)/(R−R˜)0 . . . g(rn−r˜n)/(R−R˜)n .
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Table 6.6. P4R for e-mobility redeeming refund protocol.
P U
rnd, w∈RZq
RT′ = RTrnd, R = R× rnd
Verify and store rc′′′ RT





skvPBLS ) ?= e(RT′, h) money−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
6.5 Security and Privacy Analysis
In this section, we provide the main (informal) arguments why our scheme satisfies
the security objectives stated in Section 6.3. A formal security proof based on the
proof for the basic P4R scheme given in [86] is left as future work. While out of the
scope of this paper, it would also have to be ensured that the scheme’s implementation
does not invalidate the security objectives. This could be verified by an independent
trusted party, or the code could be put in the public domain.
Objective I requires that (a) payment tokens are only generated, if a user proves
his wish to receive them, (b) when depositing money, a user receives valid payment
tokens, which only he can spend, and (c) a user is paid correct refunds, which only
he can redeem. (a) is ensured as a withdrawal process is only initiated if a user sends
a signature on the number of coins he would like to receive to the payment service
provider, thus indirectly authenticating and proving his wish to receive a certain
amount of payment tokens. (b) is satisfied, as a user only accepts the withdrawal of
a payment token if he received a valid one, and only he can spend them as knowledge
of his secret key is required during the spending procedure. (c) is achieved because a
user checks during the (re-)charge e-wallet process, whether he received a valid refund
token. Using the list of published refund check values from the payment service
provider he checks during or after each stop charging process, whether a correct
refund was added to his refund token. An electricity provider could display the price
of electricity before a charging process is started and a user’s car could measure the
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received energy, such that the user can compute the refund he should receive himself.
A user thus ensures that he has a valid refund token at all times. If he would further
store all intermediate RT′ that he received from the payment service provider until he
redeems RT, he could prove to a judge that he is in possession of a valid RT encoding v
by showing that based on respective RT′ the subsequently generated RT′′ was formed
correctly. Secondly, only a user himself is able to redeem his (correctly received) RT
as he has to authenticate before the redeem refund process and the serial number of
his RT was bound to his identity. The payment service provider cannot claim that a
user has already redeemed a refund token, as he would need to present a receipt from
the user to prove this statement. Note that, as we only consider passive adversaries,
an adversary may not exchange a user’s refund token for his own when a user is about
to collect his refund from an electricity provider (cf. Table 6.5).
Objective II requires that a user can (d) anonymously and unlinkably (w.r.t. the
withdrawal of the payment tokens or other charging transactions) present payment
tokens, (e) authenticate at a charging station again, after leaving during a charging
process, and (f) collect and redeem refunds in a privacy-preserving manner. (d) is
ensured by the blindness property of Brands’ blind signature scheme. Thus, when
giving out a payment token the payment service provider does not know whom it
had given it to. Due to allowing the encoding of attributes into payment tokens,
achieving this objective becomes more difficult. It needs to be ensured that the
collected data does not allow conclusions about a user’s identity. (e) is achieved due
to the possibility of showing a payment token twice, without revealing the identity of
the user, which allows a privacy-preserving double-authentication. (f) is ensured as a
refund token is blinded each time it is presented to the payment service provider or
an electricity provider. This makes sure that the payment service provider and the
electricity providers cannot track an RT due to its appearance.
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Objective III requires that (g) only a payment service provider can generate valid
payment tokens, (h) a user cannot not deny her wish to withdraw payment tokens after
a withdrawal process, (i) a payment token can be used to pay for only one charging
process, (j) an electricity provider cannot claim to be credited more money than what
she claimed to be the value of charge given to a user during a charging process, and
(k) a user can only redeem refunds that he correctly collected over a period of time.
(g) is ensured due to the security/unforgeability of blind signatures. (h) is ensured
as a user provides a signature on the number of payment tokens he would like to
receive during the (re-)charge e-wallet process. The payment service provider can
use the signature to prove to a judge that he acted correctly. (i) is achieved by the
double-spending detection mechanism. If the user uses the same payment token for
another charging process, her identity can be revealed from the payment transcripts
and she can be fined. (j) is ensured as an electricity provider cannot deposit payment
tokens multiple times without this malicious behavior being revealed and further she
cannot claim that a wrong value had been credited to her account, as she provided
a receipt over this value. (k) is achieved as a user can only redeem a refund token,
of which the serial number is stored in the payment service provider’s refund token
database. Further refunds can only be added to the refund token by the payment
service provider. And third a user gives a receipt to a payment service provider
proving that she has redeemed a particular refund token. She can thus not redeem a
refund token multiple times. Note that the payment service provider could exclude a
user from the payment service, if he would not provide this receipt.
Objective IV requires that an electricity provider only accepts valid payment to-
kens and that he is credited the value of electric charge he gave out. To ensure this
an electricity provider checks the validity of a payment token when receiving it and
receives a receipt from the payment service provider that vPT − vRF will be credited
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to her account. He can then prove to a judge that she should had been credited the
amount.
6.6 Implementation on an NFC-Smartphone
This section arose from collaborative work with Olga Korobova, who was super-
vised during a student project by the author of this dissertation.
A popular technology for mobile payments is NFC due to its fast and simple com-
munication set-up, which only requires that NFC-enabled devices are brought into
close proximity with each other. With a market share of almost 80%, Android is
the dominating smartphone operating system in use today1. We hence analyze the
performance of the proposed payment system on this very popular platform. In par-
ticular we used a Google Nexus 5 smartphone, which has a Qualcomm Snapdragon
S800 Quadcore processor with 2 GB of RAM running at 2.3 GHz. This phone sup-
ports Android 4.4 KitKat, which is the first Android version to support host-based
card emulation. Host-based card emulation allows to emulate the functionality of a
contactless smartcard on the main CPU of the device, relying on NFC for communi-
cation with a contactless reader. We developed a hybrid Java/C application for the
smartphone using the Android Developer Tools.
As terminal we used a laptop featuring an Intel Core i5 CPU running at 1.4 GHz.
The terminal represents a charging station of an electricity provider as well as the
back-end of the payment service provider. This leaves out the communication between
a charging station and the payment service provider’s back-end via the Internet.
We emphasize that our focus is on measuring the required execution time on the
mobile payment device as well as the time for communicating protocol data between
the payment device and a terminal via NFC, which has a quite limited bandwidth
1Smartphone OS Market Share, Q1 2015. http://www.idc.com/prodserv/
smartphone-os-market-share.jsp
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compared to a strong Internet connection. Terminals can be equipped with powerful
hardware, dedicated to execute the required protocols, whereas the phone is powered
with a battery and thus limited in computational power. In the implementation whose
performance results we present in Section 6.7 the data that is communicated between
an electricity provider and a payment service provider is only 806 bytes in length. An
Internet connection should thus not represent a bottleneck in the system. The NFC
communication was set up with an HID OMNIKEY 5321 v2 smartcard reader that
was connected to the PC via USB. We developed a Java application for the terminal,
using the Java Smart Card I/O API summarized in the javax.smartcardio package.
This package allows an easy implementation of communication with a smartcard and
thus the host-based emulated card on the NFC-smartphone.
We based the cryptographic functionality on the free portable C Pairing Based
Cryptography (PBC) library2 version 0.5.13. We implemented all protocol functions
in C and then called those from our Java applications using the Java Native Interface
(JNI). We use asymmetric pairings as none of our building blocks requires G1 = G2.
Note that in our scheme most protocol steps only require computation in G1. Thus
asymmetric pairings present a better choice, as pairing parameters can be chosen in
a way that computation in G1 relies on a very limited bit length and thus allows
efficient computations in this group [37]. We rely on the Type F pairing parameters
given in the PBC library. Those are parameters for pairing-friendly elliptic curves
of prime order proposed by Barreto et al. in [8] achieving an embedding degree of
12. As mentioned in the PBC manual only 160 bits are required for elements in G1,
whereas 320 bits are required for elements in G2.
2http://crypto.stanford.edu/pbc/
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6.7 Performance of the Proposed Payment Scheme on an
NFC-Smartphone
We implemented the scheme for a payment token value of $10, thus allowing refund
values of up to $10. We further set the refund unit to be 1 ¢ allowing refund values
of 0 ¢ up to 1000 ¢. We ran the scheme 200 times choosing the system parameters,
i.e. the generators of G1 and G2 as well as the secret keys randomly each time and
collected timings varying the refund values in a deterministic way. For each checked
refund token value we ran the protocol 10 times. Note that the protocol timings
depend on the hamming weight of vRF. This is because the more vRFi are one, the
more RT′′i+1 have to be computed on the terminal side and have to be sent to the
user and even more importantly the more pairing equations have to be checked by
the user to verify whether the correct refund value has been encoded in her refund
token.
We implemented the scheme for the case of encoding two attributes into a pay-
ment token, and revealing only one attribute. Revealing another attribute would
increase the communicated data that a user has to send to the electricity provider by
24 bytes. In our implementation 468 bytes are communicated via NFC during spend-
ing, which requires 33.5 ms (cf. Table 6.7). We thus anticipate that the increase in
communication time would be low, if another attribute was revealed.
We first verified by practical analysis that the location of the one bit in vRF does
not influence the execution time, by measuring execution times for the refund values
vRF = 2i for 0 < i < 10. We then collected timings in which we increased the
hamming weight of the refund value during each iteration, i.e. starting from vRF = 0
we measured timings for each vRF = 2i+1 in which 0 < i < 10. Table 6.7 presents the
average results for running the scheme, where the hamming weight of the refund value
was incremented in every tenth iteration, thus presenting the average execution time.
We give numbers for the overall computation on the phone (column Smartphone),
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Table 6.7. Execution times of the various protocols of our payment scheme, based
on a Google Nexus 5 NFC-smartphone, using host-based card emulation. The timings
are averaged for refund values of all possible hamming weights.
Smartphone Terminal Communication Total
User Registration 273.6 ms 5.1 ms 716.0 ms 994.2 ms
(Re-) Charge E-wallet 412.3 ms 25.8 ms 139.6 ms 577.7 ms
Start Charging 0 ms 12.6 ms 33.5 ms 46, 1 ms
Stop Charging 1614.7 ms 42.9 ms 176 ms 1833, 6 ms
Redeem Refund 11.9 ms 134.3 ms 73.3 ms 219, 5 ms
the overall communication time (column Communication), the overall computation
on the terminal (column Terminal) and the overall execution time of each protocol
step (column Total). These results are illustrated in Figure 6.2.
The results demonstrate that all transactions can be executed within 2 seconds.
We emphasize that the time critical transactions are the start charging and stop
charging process, as those are executed regularly at a charging station at the beginning
and end of a charging process. The registration on the other hand is executed only
once per user, whenever new system parameters are generated, which could be done at
a regular basis once a year. (Re-)charging the electronic wallet could be executed by
the payment application running in the background on the phone. We thus focus our
analysis on the start charging and stop charging process. While the start charging
process clearly presents an acceptable execution performance, the execution of the
stop charging process is quite long, with an average execution time of 1.8 seconds.
We extended our analysis for this part and present solutions to this problem.
We present timings for the Stop Charging protocol, incrementing the hamming
weight of the refund value in Figure 6.3. Note that without computing the pairing
equations to check, whether the correct refund has been encoded in RT′ the End
Charging protocol executes in 223.1 ms on average. A solution would thus be that a
user checks whether he received correct refunds at a later point in time. The payment



































Figure 6.2. Illustration of Table 6.7, presenting the execution times of the various
protocols of our payment scheme, based on a Google Nexus 5 NFC-smartphone, using
host-based card emulation. The timings are averaged for refund values of all possible
hamming weights.
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to her refund token. Generating and validating a receipt is quite efficient, as it only
requires computations in G1 in our scheme. If the user finds out that the payment
service provider has added a wrong value to his refund token or has generated an
invalid refund token, the user could use this receipt in front of a judge.
This solution leads to further system variations. In a real-world scenario security-
critical operations of the payment application would have to be executed on secure
hardware as for example the secure element of a smartphone rather than its main
CPU. This hardware can be assumed to be equally powerful to that of a smartcard.
It is further highly desirable to allow different types of payment devices, as it can-
not be expected that every user is in possession of a powerful NFC smartphone. In
addition to using one’s smartphone a device such as a smartcard should be offered
to users at low cost. We would like to emphasize that all user side’s computation,
apart from checking whether a correct refund was added to the refund token, requires
computations in G1 only, which in our case is a 160-bit elliptic curve. Those com-
putations could be executed on a smartcard-like device (cf. Chapter 5). Note that
the pairing equation checks, which are executed in order to verify that a refund was
encoded into the refund token correctly, only involve computations using public keys.
Those could thus be executed on the smartphone’s main processor or a terminal such
as a user’s personal computer, which a smartcard could be connected to.
We note that the communication takes quite a significant amount of time during
the execution of the respective protocols. This partially originates from the fact that
we had to split up communicated data into multiple APDUs, as one APDU can carry
up to a maximum of 255 bytes of data only. This is because one byte in an APDU
is dedicated to indicate the length of the sent data. Extended APDUs have been
introduced in which this length is indicated with a value stored in two bytes, thus
allowing a maximum of 65535 bytes of data to be sent at once. While this was not
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Figure 6.3. Execution times of the End Charging protocol for different refund values,
incrementing the hamming weight of the refund value in each column.
6.8 Variations
We rely on a double-spending detection mechanism to punish fraudulent behavior,
as this spreads the load of the back-end of the payment service provider. If fraud
should be prevented one would instead rely on an online payment system. This
would require a determination, whether a coin had been spent before, in real time,
thus requiring real-time access to the payment token database of the payment service
provider. At the same time this would reduce the complexity of the scheme, as no
double-spending detection mechanism that reveals the identity of a cheating party
would be required.
In our scheme an active adversary could interrupt the communication in the End
Charging protocol and present his refund token instead of the user’s refund token.
This way the refund would be added to the adversary’s refund token. An extension
would be desirable in which the presented refund token in the End Charging protocol
would be bound to the presented payment token, thus preventing this type of active
attack.
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It is desirable that a user can feed back electric energy to the grid, thus allowing
to store electric energy in electric mobiles whenever a surplus is produced and feeding
it back whenever there is a lack of electric energy. This can be achieved with our
system, giving out payment tokens of zero value, which a user can use to authenticate
to a charging station twice. The value of the energy that she fed back into the grid
would then be credited to her refund token.
6.9 Discussion
We proposed how to adapt the lightweight privacy-preserving pre-payments with
refunds scheme (P4R), which targets public transportation payment systems, to the
e-mobility domain. Relying on the same payment scheme to be used for public trans-
portation systems and in the e-mobility domain greatly increases user convenience.
We allow the encoding of attributes into payment tokens and their selective disclosure.
We further presented a full implementation of the proposed scheme on a Google Nexus
5 NFC-smartphone together with a thorough analysis of its performance. Apart from
checking whether a refund was added correctly to a user’s refund token, the time
critical start charging and stop charging processes can be executed in 46 ms and
223 ms respectively. Including the refund check increases the execution time of the
stop charging process to 1.8 seconds, which can be a limiting factor. We presented




The ever-increasing processing power and hence the possibility to analyze large
data sets increases the importance of privacy protection. It is thus of utter impor-
tance to design systems that by design protect the privacy of their users. This is
particularly important in the domain of electronic payments. While electronic pay-
ments have many advantages for payers and payees, currently employed electronic
payment systems usually reveal a payer’s identity during a payment. This allows to
generate fine grain patterns of users’ behavior. In this dissertation we focused on a
very concrete case, namely the analysis of privacy-preserving transportation payment
systems. The unique characteristics of payments in the transportation domain are
the high number of payments that have to be executed every day and the facts that
the paid value is usually low and that payments have to be executed quickly in order
to avoid congestion at the entrance points of a transportation system.
We analyzed the use of e-cash for the transportation setting and presented advan-
tages and disadvantages of implementations of various payment system configurations
resulting in designs that maintain or increase high standards of user convenience,
while at the same time ensuring security and allowing the protection of users’ pri-
vacy. We targeted various aspects of the implementation of the considered e-cash
schemes, ranging from high-level implementations on NFC-enabled smartphones to
low-level implementations for extremely constrained passively powered RFID-tags.
By practical evaluation, we demonstrated that e-cash presents a promising solu-
tion for privacy-preserving payments in public transportation systems, if the number
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of coins that have to be spent per payment can be kept low. While the computation
required for the time-critical spending of a single coin can be executed in 13 ms even
on the passively powered computational RFID tag Moo the less time-critical with-
drawal requires several seconds, which however could be sped up relying on hardware
accelerators. We further showed that the limitation of having to keep the number
of spent coins low can be alleviated by using the privacy-preserving pre-payments
with refunds scheme (P4R). P4R adds a flexible privacy-preserving refund system to
e-cash. Together with the fact that in P4R a fare price can be determined at an exit
point of the transportation system, this allows for a very flexible and dynamic pricing
system where prices can be adapted to customer attributes (as for example their age)
and transport conditions. We further analyzed how to use specific features of e-cash
protocols to target the unique requirements of transportation payment systems, one
of them being the encoding of user attributes into coins, which we showed can be done
at only a moderate performance loss. Using off-the-shelf smartcards the payment of
an electronic coin, which encodes two user attributes, which are not revealed, can
be executed in under 800 ms. Moreover, we presented a privacy-preserving payment
scheme targeting the unique requirements of e-mobility, where it is desired that a
user pays for the received charge at the end of a charging process, when the amount
of charge can be determined, and at the same time it has to be ensured that a user
cannot finalize the charging process avoiding to pay for received charge. Here the
charging process can be started within 46 ms, while finalizing the charging process
requires 1.8 s.
A general limitation of e-cash based payment systems, which is a limitation of all
electronic payment schemes in which a user has to load an electronic wallet, is the fact
that a user always gives up a certain level of privacy by loading his payment device.
By analyzing the overall amount of money a user spends on fares, the transportation
authority knows, whether a user tends to take shorter or longer trips, though it cannot
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differentiate between those users that take only few long trips versus those that take
many short trips.
While this thesis focused on the implementation aspects and practicability as-
pects of e-cash, several interesting new e-cash protocols have been proposed recently.
One of them is transferable e-cash [6], which does not require that a shop deposits
a received coin to his bank account right away, but allows to move coins back and
forth between users and shops multiple times, reaching a user experience similar to
physical cash. We propose the practical analysis of advanced e-cash schemes as a
promising future research direction. As such, many advanced e-cash protocols rely
on cryptographic pairings, while the implementation of lightweight pairings has not
yet been investigated thoroughly. As a further future research direction for the im-
plementation of e-cash schemes we hence propose the analysis of light-weight pairing
implementations in hard- and software.
In conclusion, one can say that this thesis demonstrates that e-cash is not only
interesting from a theoretical perspective. Efficient and practical realization of e-
cash schemes are feasible and present a promising alternative for classic electronic
payments, especially in the transportation domain.
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